Rethinking Rights in Biospace

Robin Feldman
UC Hastings College of the Law, feldmanr@uchastings.edu

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Twenty-five years ago, federal courts opened the door to the biotechnology revolution by granting patents on genetic inventions. Since that time, decisions across five disparate doctrines reflect confusion over the question of whether the definition of a biotechnology invention should include things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention. Reaching beyond the state of the art may make sense for mechanical inventions, but it is wreaking havoc in doctrines related to biotechnology.

This Article argues that in uncertain arts such as biotechnology, the definition of an invention should be limited to the state of the art at the time of the invention. Granting rights beyond knowledge at the time of the invention projects an enormous shadow across the future and creates untenable results. The temptation to restrain that reach has led to strange doctrinal twists and an unworkable body of law. After twenty-five years of experience, it is time to rethink our view of the proper shape of rights in this realm.
I. INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court opened the door to the biotechnology revolution by granting inventors the right to hold patents on genetically engineered organisms. In the seminal case of *Diamond v. Chakrabarty*, the Court ruled that inventors can patent an organism itself, not just the process of creating it. Although the outcome was revolutionary, the resulting legal doctrines were familiar. The case and its progeny would treat biologic inventions, such as genetically engineered organisms and laboratory crafted genes, the way patent law treats mechanical products, such as dishwashers and doorknobs.

*Chakrabarty* helped pave the way for the explosion in the biotechnology industry. The nature of such inventions, however, increasingly conflicts with rules crafted for mechanical products. In particular, decisions across five disparate doctrines reflect confusion over the question of whether the definition of a biotechnology invention should include things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.

In patent law, we define a product by identifying its structure. Once the structure is identified, the inventor then controls the product, no matter what materials are used to make it, or what method is used to construct it. For example, suppose our simple mechanical invention is a doorknob. Once the patent holder identifies the “doorknob” invention by describing the structure of a doorknob, the patent holder controls all doorknobs. This is true regardless of whether the other doorknobs are made of wood, glass, or plastic. The rule is intended to protect inventors from those who would make minor alterations and claim “a new product.”

While the rule may make sense in the context of simple mechanical inventions, it wreaks havoc in the realm of biotechnology. For example, suppose the invention is not a doorknob, but an antibody. The inventor begins by isolating and identifying a harmful agent, perhaps something that causes cancer in humans. Next, the inventor isolates and identifies a single antibody that binds with the harmful agent. Based on identifying the single antibody, the inventor then claims the right to all antibodies that bind with the harmful agent. In simplified terms, the inventor wishes to claim the class of things created by the immune system that bind with the relevant agent. Analogous to claiming the class of doorknobs, the inventor claims

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the class of relevant antibodies, no matter what materials are used to make the antibodies or how they are constructed.

We know much more about doorknobs, however, than we do about antibodies. For example, we know much more about the materials that can be used to construct doorknobs than we do about the materials that can be used to construct antibodies.

Suppose that at the time of the antibody invention described above, antibodies were made in the lab using DNA-encoding materials from mice. At that time, no one in the field of science knew how to do much beyond that. Suppose that a later inventor constructs the relevant antibody using DNA-encoding materials from a combination of different species, perhaps one section from human materials and another section from mouse materials. Or better yet, suppose an inventor creates an appropriate antibody using materials almost entirely from the human body, so that the antibody could be administered to human patients without the risk of rejection. Suppose further that development of a humanized antibody that binds to a specific antigen would be quite difficult to accomplish, and humanized antibodies were entirely unknown when the mouse-based antibody was created. Should we nevertheless grant the inventor of the relevant mouse antibody control of all relevant humanized ones?

A doorknob is a doorknob, regardless of whether it is made of wood or glass. Can we really say, however, that an antibody is an antibody, no matter how it works or what materials it is made out of? Moreover, are we prepared to say that an antibody is an antibody at a time when our knowledge of why particular antibodies arise in the body and how they fit into the body's overall organic processes is limited?

This issue goes to the heart of the definition of an invention. Each invention must be defined in a way that appropriately captures the nature of the advancement as distinct from prior and future creations. One can think of this as the footprint of the invention—in other words, how far an inventor can reach against inventions that existed before and how far an inventor can reach against those that will come after.

Modern case law reflects confusion over whether the footprint of an invention includes things unknown at the time of the invention. Despite precedent from cases related to mechanical inventions, courts have increasingly shied away from permitting biotechnology inventors to reach embodiments and characteristics unknown at the time of the invention. They have done so, however, without a comprehensive vision of the
problem or how to solve it. The result is a wealth of contradictory opinions and unworkable doctrines.

For example, cases concerning how far a biotechnology inventor can reach toward future inventions stand in contradiction to each other. Some opinions conclude broadly that the definition of an invention includes all embodiments, even those that could not have existed at the time of the invention.\(^2\) Other opinions use claim construction doctrines to limit a patent holder’s reach only to embodiments known at the time of the invention.\(^3\) Still others use a different set of doctrines to conclude that a patent holder’s reach sometimes includes things that were unknown at the time of the invention, but not always.\(^4\) These opinions, pulling in different directions, make it difficult to predict how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions.

Similar confusion exists in the doctrines related to how far an inventor can reach toward earlier inventions. In general, a new invention cannot be defined to include someone else’s prior invention, or “prior art.”\(^5\) Some opinions find that prior art includes things that were inherent in a prior invention, but that no one knew about.\(^6\) Other courts decline to read prior art in that manner.\(^7\) Still other courts answer the question of how far an inventor can reach toward prior inventions by referencing doctrines concerning how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions.\(^8\) As described above, doctrines related to defining earlier inventions are remarkably confused about whether an invention includes things unknown at the time of the invention. Most importantly, the convergence of these areas demonstrates the futility of addressing piecemeal the question of whether the definition of an invention includes things unknown at the time of the invention.

One could argue that we should live with the inconsistencies. In fact, some scholars suggest that we define an invention one way for one set of doctrines and another way for another set of doctrines.\(^9\) Such an approach,

\(^2\) See infra Part III.A.1.
\(^3\) See infra Part III.A.2.
\(^4\) See infra Part III.A.3.
\(^5\) See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available”).
\(^6\) See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); infra Part III.B.
\(^7\) See infra note 191 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
\(^8\) See infra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
\(^9\) See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
however, inevitably leads to the type of chaos we are now experiencing. How can we hold up a sphere and say, "When we look at it from one direction it is an apple, and when we look at it from another direction it is an orange"? We must establish a clear and comprehensive vision of how to define an invention. Without this, we cannot hope to create a workable body of law.

This Article argues that in uncertain arts such as biotechnology, the definition of an invention should be limited to the state of the art at the time of the invention. Biospace inventions\(^\text{10}\) are not like mechanical products. Rather, they are elements in a complex biological interaction, one which we understand only glimpses of at best.\(^\text{11}\) In light of this, we cannot simply define their structure and then grant rights to all embodiments of that structure and everything inherent therein.

Granting rights beyond the state of knowledge at the time of the invention can project an enormous shadow of rights across the future and lead to untenable results. The temptation to restrain that reach is leading to strange doctrinal twists and an unworkable body of law. After twenty-five years of experience, it is time to rethink our view of the proper shape of rights in this realm.

II. THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE IN BIOSPACE INVENTIONS

A. PATENTING LIVING ORGANISMS

In 1972, microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty filed a patent application for a genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.\(^\text{12}\) Although bacteria found in nature could degrade individual components of oil, no natural bacteria could degrade a combination of oil components. This made Chakrabarty’s invention particularly promising for cleaning up oil spills.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{10}\) See infra text accompanying note 22.

\(^{11}\) For example, Anne Magurran has noted that "[g]enes do not act singly, but in complex networks intermeshing biochemical pathways that form a tangled web of development." Anne E. Magurran, *It’s Not All in the Genes*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, § 7, at 22, available at 2004 WLNR 5499896 (citing Henry Gee’s discussion of the German school of naturphilosophie and its relevance for modern genetic theories).


Chakrabarty's application included claims related to the process for manufacturing the organism, claims which were approved without much consternation. The more difficult claims concerned rights to the living organism itself.

The patent examiner rejected Chakrabarty's claims related to the organism itself on grounds including that living things are not patentable subject matter because they are nature's creation rather than man's. The case reached the Supreme Court on the question of whether living things may be patentable subject matter.

Patentable subject matter is governed by § 101 of the Patent Act. The section states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent ...." The Supreme Court, noting the expansive language of this section, concluded that Congress intended to provide a wide scope for patentable subject matter, one that would include the types of laboratory-created matter claimed by Chakrabarty. As the Court explained, "Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research."

After Chakrabarty, it was clear that laboratory-created inventions with characteristics markedly different from nature are patentable subject matter, assuming, of course, that the inventor could identify the potential for significant utility. The decision, therefore, announced clearly that

14. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305-06.
15. Id. at 306.
16. See id. at 307.
18. Id.
19. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (describing expansiveness of the terms); id. at 306 (describing the inventions as "laboratory-created micro-organisms").
20. See id. at 313.
21. See id. at 310. Some commentators argue that the biotechnology revolution would have moved forward unimpeded without Chakrabarty. Inventors would have relied on patents for the process of creating the thing, rather than obtaining a patent on the thing itself, or inventors would have protected the invention as a trade secret. See Lisa Yount, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 66 (2000) (citing patent attorney Mitchel Zoler's belief that the decision was "trivial law" and patent attorney Donald Dunner's estimation that the ruling was not life or death for the industry). Others argue that the decision broke no new legal ground but provided only a minor clarification of existing law. Nevertheless, the decision provided a tremendous boost to the biotechnology industry. Id. Following the ruling, the Patent and Technology Office felt free to rule on the dozens of applications pending on genetically engineered organisms. In addition, publicity from the decision stimulated investment in the
inventors could protect the organism itself, not just the process of creating it.

To create his invention, Chakrabarty used a process that can be classified as genetic engineering, but did not involve recombinant DNA. Many modern biologic inventions are invented using recombinant DNA. Others are created as a result of techniques that involve recombinant materials or bioengineering. To avoid the technicalities of what constitutes biotechnology or one type of biologic invention as opposed to another, I have chosen the term biospace. One can think of biospace as the commercial space that includes things such as biotech creations and inventions produced as a result of techniques that involve bioengineering or biotechnology.

B. FROM PATENTING WHOLE ORGANISMS TO PATENTING THE COMPONENTS OF LIFE

In a 1987 ruling, the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") extended the doctrine announced in Chakrabarty to grant rights in more complex organisms such as oysters. The PTO, however, carefully excluded the possibility of rights in human beings. Despite this limitation, the ruling also extended patent protection to components of life, such as genes, cells, and organs, including components of human life.

To grant patent rights for various components of life, the courts and the PTO have relied on a combination of two types of authorities. The logic begins with the notion from Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter includes things found in nature as long as the inventor changes the product industry. See id.; Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 185–86 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).  

22. See YOUNT, supra note 21, at 62. Some legal scholars describe Chakrabarty's invention as a recombinant process, but Lisa Yount explains that Chakrabarty's invention should not be considered recombinant because the individual plasmids were unaltered. Compare Conley & Makowski, supra note 13, at 372 (describing Chakrabarty's invention as accomplished by recombinant DNA methods) with YOUNT, supra note 21, at 62 (characterizing Chakrabarty's accomplishment as utilizing recombinant DNA methods). For a description of recombinant DNA, see infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.


24. See id.

25. See id.
to differ from the naturally occurring form.\footnote{26} In the case of components such as human genes, authorities hold that the invention differs from the naturally occurring form when the gene has been isolated and purified from its natural setting.\footnote{27}

The general rule that patents may be granted on things purified and isolated from their natural state can be traced to a decision by Judge Learned Hand in 1911.\footnote{28} In \textit{Parke-Davis \& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.}, Judge Hand granted a patent on a substance purified from the adrenal glands of cadavers.\footnote{29} The opinion reasoned that although the relevant substance already existed in nature, the purified form could constitute a new product because the purified form allowed a new and practical use.\footnote{30}

The logical basis for patenting many biospace inventions rests on both the \textit{Chakrabarty} and the \textit{Parke-Davis} lines of cases. In many recombinant technologies, for example, genes are isolated from their natural state, similar to the adrenaline in \textit{Parke-Davis}, and then altered to behave differently, similar to the genetically modified bacteria in \textit{Chakrabarty}.

\section*{C. \textsc{The One Embodiment Doctrine}}

Custom and practice in the courts and the patent industry separate patentable subject matter broadly into two types of patents: (1) products and (2) processes.\footnote{31} The Patent Act itself does not employ such a neat, bipolar categorization. Rather, the Act lists the categories of patentable subject matter as processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of


\footnote{28} See \textit{Parke-Davis \& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.}, 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), \textit{aff'd}, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). \textit{See also} \textit{Merck \& Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.}, 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958).

\footnote{29} \textit{Parke-Davis}, 189 F. at 103.

\footnote{30} See \textit{id}.

\footnote{31} See, \textit{e.g.}, Nestle-Le Mur Co. v. Eugene, Ltd., 55 F.2d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1932) (noting that machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter are all products or articles and differ fundamentally in nature from processes); Caterpillar Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1996), \textit{aff'd}, 194 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); I DONALD S. CHISUM, \textsc{CHISUM ON PATENTS} § 1.02 (2003) (separating patentable subject matter into products and processes and noting that an applicant for a product patent is not required to specify whether it is for a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Varying phrases may be used to refer to these categories. \textit{See, e.g.}, Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 922, (Fed. Cir. 1984) (using the terms "apparatus" and "method"); John R. Thomas, \textit{Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules}, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER \& INFO. L. 219, 225 (1998) (using the terms "artifact" and "processes or method").
matter, and improvements thereof. Nevertheless, the two general categories and the distinction between them have profound implications for patent rights.

Traditionally, a product claim is defined in terms of structural characteristics. In other words, an inventor will claim rights to a particular machine, which can be described by its structural design. To qualify as patentable subject matter, however, the inventor must demonstrate that the product has a use beyond mere academic curiosity. Once the inventor identifies a single use for the product, the inventor may exclude others from the full spectrum of the product, including any use of the product and other embodiments of the product. Thus, one embodiment provides an inventor with a broad range of rights.

The same is not true for a process claim. For example, if Chakrabarty had received a patent on the process of making the microorganism, he would have controlled only microorganisms made using the process he had invented, not those made in any other way. By securing product rights, however, Chakrabarty was protected by the "one

33. See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.05 (2003).
35. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d. 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946); Maurer v. Dickerson, 113 F. 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1902) (finding "that the claim is not restricted to the product made by the described process, but covers the chemical individual, however produced"); Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001) (noting that "[a] patent on a composition gives exclusive rights to the composition for a limited time, even if the inventor disclosed only a single use"); Symposium, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 371, 392 (2002) (noting that the law extends patent rights to unknown embodiments with unknown utilities when the inventor has disclosed one embodiment with one utility); Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts—Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 608, 611 (1988) (noting that a claim to a composition of matter is not limited to the method of making or usage taught by the inventor). See also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that it is not necessary that a patent application test all embodiments of an invention); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (same); Continuous Curve Contact Lenses, Inc. v. Nat'l Patent Dev. Corp., No. CV 77-802, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13879, at *113-14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1982) (noting it is well established that product claims without process limitations cover the product, no matter how it is produced). But see 3 CHISUM, supra note 33, § 9.05 n.1 (noting early cases with contrary results).

New uses may qualify for their own patents, in which case the parties hold patents that block each other. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095. The use patents, however, would be limited to that particular use or process and would not cover the full spectrum of uses of the product. One who wished to engage in the new use would need permission from both the inventor holding the original product patent and the inventor holding the new use patent.

36. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853); Winner, supra note 35, at 610-11 (noting that unlike composition of matter claims, an inventor of one method of achieving a result cannot claim all methods of achieving that result).
The one embodiment notion has different implications in the context of mechanical inventions than in the context of biospace inventions. With a machine, it is possible to define an invention by identifying its structure. This is not to suggest that the inquiry is always easy or clear-cut, but at least the terms of the inquiry are more easily defined by focusing on the structure of the invention.

Thinking back to the doorknob, for example, the structural design is what matters. It is what allows the thing to fit in the palm of your hand, rotate easily, and integrate with and latch the door. Varying the materials or the type of screwdriver used to make the doorknob is unlikely to make much difference in terms of what the invention has contributed to society. Furthermore, we know the elements that make up the doorknob, such as the grip, the shaft that goes into the door, and the latch that goes into the doorframe. There are no pieces we cannot explain or hints that the doorknob might be integrating with the door in ways we never dreamed.

With biospace inventions, however, we grant rights in the face of significant unknowns. While mechanical inventions are considered a predictable art, biospace inventions are considered an unpredictable art. For example, consider patent rights to genes isolated or manipulated in ways distinguishable from genes undisturbed in the human body. Genes are segments of the DNA double helix that exists inside cells from a living being.

37. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1094–95 (noting that DNA claims should be given the same scope as other composition of matter claims, such that one use brings a right to all uses, even those unknown at the time of the patent).

38. The machine analogy works reasonably well with chemical inventions. With chemicals, the invention generally resides in the structural design of the new compound. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557–58 (Fed. Cir. 1995); A Patent System for the 21st Century 92 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2005). Although there are exceptions, normally, the method of making the compound is obvious once the structural design is determined. Moreover, the question of whether the compound is sufficiently inventive over prior compounds rests frequently on a comparison of the structural similarity between compounds. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 827, 835–36 (1999).

39. See Jeffie A. Kopczynski, Note, A New Era for § 112? Exploring Recent Developments in the Written Description Requirement as Applied to Biotechnology Inventions, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 229, 238 (2002) (explaining that predictable arts, like the mechanical field, are those in which modifications to a system will have recognized and predictable effects, and unpredictable arts are those in which there is insufficient learning to explain the effect that changed variables will have within a system). See also Sheila R. Arriola, Comment, Biotechnology Patents After Festo: Rethinking the Heightened Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 11 Fed. Cir. B.J. 919, 932 (2002) (noting that biotechnology has been branded an unpredictable art).
creature. Genes are made up of nucleotide building blocks. These building blocks not only form the structure of the gene, they also serve as blueprints, providing the information necessary for the cell to conduct activities such as reproducing itself and constructing proteins.

Although the sequence of the nucleotide building blocks forms the structure of the gene, there is nothing new about this structure. It already exists in nature and is not a new design of human ingenuity. The problem for human ingenuity lies in identifying which sequences might be useful, achieving the technical hurdle of separating the sequence out from its natural form and recombining it in a more useful form, and finally, determining what to do with what that form.

In many genetic experiments that lead to patents, scientists begin by identifying and separating out the DNA sequence that carries the coding information needed. For example, scientists might be trying to create large amounts of a particular protein that could be administered to human patients. Having identified and separated out the relevant sequence, the scientists prepare a piece of carrier DNA into which they can splice the relevant sequence. This carrier DNA is called a vector, and when the relevant DNA sequence has been successfully spliced into the vector, the resulting product is called a recombinant DNA. In the final steps, the scientists cultivate a host cell capable of incorporating the recombinant DNA. The host cell is primed with the proper materials so that the cell can create the desired protein using the coding information from the relevant DNA sequence.

Out of this enterprise, scientists might claim rights to the following products: the isolated and purified DNA sequence, the recombinant DNA that holds the sequence, and the transformed host cell that has incorporated the recombinant DNA and produced the protein. Scientists hoping to publish their work in a respected journal would recognize that the

40. See Karl Drlica, Understanding DNA and Gene Cloning 3 (3d ed. 1997).
41. See id. at 5, fig.1-2.
42. See id. at 2-3.
44. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (noting that the technical hurdle lies in determining the sequence).
publication could claim no more than the narrow task that had been accomplished. For example, the scientists could claim as their own work no more than the achievement of getting a particular carrier DNA to include the sequence in a particular type of cell. One could publish that and no more. The question for patent rights, however, is more expansive. Rights to the invention described above, for example, would have little value if a second comer could alter the vector slightly and escape the prior inventor's work and the reach of the patent. Thus, patent rights to this type of recombinant invention have been defined to include the isolated and purified sequence in any vector and in any host cell that includes the vector.46 Once again, analogous to the class of doorknobs, we are granting rights to the class of carrier DNA segments, regardless of what materials the carrier DNA is made up of. We grant these rights, however, in the face of significant unknowns.

Consider, for example, noncoding regions of DNA. As described above, the nucleotide building blocks of genes serve as blueprints for constructing proteins or for starting and stopping the process of protein production. Vast sequences of these nucleotide building blocks, however, do not appear to serve any such purpose. Although these sequences exist in the DNA, they drop out as DNA information is transferred through different forms to create proteins. Scientists have dubbed these stretches "noncoding" regions or "junk DNA."47 For a quarter of a century, they were considered irrelevant or evolutionary junk.48

In the last few years, however, researchers have uncovered striking evidence that noncoding regions perform different but essential functions in the human biologic process.49 For example, scientists have determined that changes in just two noncoding nucleotides determine whether a person is lactose intolerant after weaning.50

46. See id. at 106.
47. See W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, SCI. AM., Nov. 2003, at 48.
48. See id.
More importantly, many so-called noncoding regions code for RNA, rather than proteins. Scientists are discovering that RNA performs essential functions either alone or in conjunction with proteins, making these noncoding regions essential to human function.

These discoveries will have little effect on patent rights granted under many of the first generation gene patents. Such patents described the sequences in the form of a later translation after the noncoding regions drop out. Nevertheless, where patents have been granted for something that encompasses the entire DNA sequence, including coding and noncoding regions, the inventor may now control far more than imagined at the time of the invention. Similarly, patents that grant control of a gene sequence and a vector, or a host cell that encompasses the gene in a form that allows it to continue to function, may be granting control of many hidden substances and operations that we have yet to decipher.

Consider further patents related to antibodies. Antibodies defend against infection by binding to viruses and toxins in our system and interacting with such harmful agents to inactivate them. Antibodies are proteins produced by immune cells in response to instructions from the active genes in those cells. Knowing which antibody binds to a particular disease agent, as well as manufacturing and manipulating such antibodies, can be important in treating diseases ranging from AIDS to cancer to the common cold.

Suppose that an inventor has isolated a particular disease-causing agent, and we know that antibodies will bind to that agent in the human system. Having isolated the harmful agent, the inventor then can claim rights in all antibodies that will bind with the harmful agent. This is true even if the inventor has not isolated and identified any of those antibodies.

51. RNA (ribonucleic acid) is synthesized by transcription of DNA or by copying of RNA. The three types of cellular RNA—mRNA, rRNA, and tRNA—play different roles in protein synthesis. See Harvey Lodish et al., Molecular Cell Biology G-15 (4th ed. 2000).
52. See Gibbs, supra note 47, at 48–49.
53. See Bruce Alberts et al., Molecular Biology of the Cell 1375–76 (4th ed. 2002). Without antibodies, a foreign agent, also called an antigen, would bind to our cells interfering with or altering their activity. To prevent this, antibodies step in, bind to the foreign agent and interact with it, rendering it harmless.
54. Each cell contains all of an individual’s genes, but only certain genes will be activated in each cell.
55. For example, in Noelle v. Lederman, the Federal Circuit commented that based on our past precedent, as long as an applicant has disclosed a ‘fully characterized antigen,’ either by its structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, or by
The logic of granting these rights rests on combining the amount of information we already know about antibodies with the information gained once we have the harmful agent. We know much about the structure of antibodies. For example, a typical antibody has a Y-shaped structure made up of four chains of amino acids, two identical heavy chains, and two identical light chains.\footnote{Alberts et al., supra note 53, at 1376.}

Ordinarily, we would not allow an applicant to claim something by its function.\footnote{An exception to this rule is a means-plus-function claim.} Thus, in the antibodies example, we would not allow a claim to a group of things based on their propensity to bind with a particular agent. Rather, we would require structural identification.\footnote{See, e.g., Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1349.} The PTO will allow this claim, however, on the basis of the functional information combined with the structural information that we already have about antibodies in general.\footnote{Jennifer L. Davis, Comment, The Test of Primary Cloning: A New Approach to the Written Description Requirement in Biotechnological Patents, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 478 (2004). See also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2002).}

The problem with granting rights in this area lies with the amount of information we do not have. Although the general structural features of antibodies were realized nearly four decades ago, there are slight differences among antibodies that account for their ability to discriminate among targets. The rules governing the development of these slight differences remain elusive.

More importantly, different antibodies bind to different places on the harmful agent and disarm the harmful agent in different ways.\footnote{See Eli Benjamini, Richard Coico & Geoffrey Sunshine, Immunology 65–79 (4th ed. 2000).} In addition, some antibodies may be more useful than others. For example, some antibodies may bind with the harmful agent but fail to turn off its damaging activity. Claims to the class of antibodies generally are not limited to those that bind to the same place or perform in the same way.

depositing the protein in a public depository, the applicant can then claim an antibody by its binding affinity to that described antigen.

Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying patent because the applicant not only failed to describe the antibody, but also failed to describe the antigen to which it binds). Similarly, the PTO Guidelines provide that if it is well known that antibodies may be made against any protein, then the inventor may claim any antibody that binds to antigen X without specifically disclosing such antibody. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SYNOPSIS OF APPLICATION OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES 59–60 (2001), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf.
Antibodies also may have cross-reactivity with harmful agents other than the one identified in the invention. Suppose that based on isolating and identifying a harmful agent, an inventor claims all antibodies that bind with that agent. Later, it turns out that one of these antibodies also binds with something else or performs some other function unrelated to the harmful agent. The inventor still holds rights to that antibody for any operation and in any context.

The notion that later research may yield new information about biological elements and processes is not merely theoretical. Consider the case of *Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.* The case concerned patent rights related to a particular leukocyte interferon. Leukocytes are white blood cells and interferons are proteins that play important roles in fighting viruses and tumors. When the patent application was filed, scientists viewed leukocyte interferons as a single category. While the application was pending, however, scientists determined that different species of interferons exist. This revelation led to a change in the scientific terminology as well as questions for the Federal Circuit concerning how to treat the patent.

The examples above highlight the problems of granting rights in the face of significant unknowns. In some cases, we know there are things we do not know. In others, experience suggests science will show us things we have never dreamed we did not know. Whether we are talking about known unknowns or unknown unknowns, the patent system is faced with the problem of granting rights in the face of incomplete information. This is particularly true of biospace inventions in which we may never fully solve the mystery of the human body and the intricate interactions of its myriad parts and functions.

Waiting for full illumination is unlikely to produce the types of incentives that would encourage scientists to continue the hunt. Despite the extent of uncertainties and unknowns in biospace, inventors are creating significant advances that provide tangible benefits to society and substantially promote progress in the field. Given the commercial realities

61. See id. at 51–52.
63. See id. at 1349.
64. See id. at 1352.
65. See id.
66. See id. For a more detailed discussion of *Schering v. Amgen*, see infra notes 86–106 and accompanying text.
for biospace companies, the challenge is to craft rights in a way that has some economic vitality and reflects the inventor's contribution without reaching into unknown territory and hindering downstream innovation.

III. DOCTRINAL CHAOS

Although the one embodiment notion may make sense for mechanical inventions, it leads to uncomfortable results for fields in which much is unknown at the time of the invention. Struggling with the implications of the rule, courts have introduced a variety of doctrinal rules that stand in contradiction to each other and point in different theoretical directions. In particular, courts have failed to establish a consistent vision of whether the definition of an invention includes anything beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention. The tension appears both in doctrines related to how far a patent holder can reach toward later inventions and how far a patent holder can reach toward prior inventions.

A. HOW FAR CAN A PATENT HOLDER REACH TOWARD LATER INVENTIONS?

On the question of whether the definition of an invention reaches beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention, the contradictions are most striking in the doctrines related to how far a patent holder can reach toward later inventions. In this arena, some opinions conclude broadly that one embodiment grants rights to all embodiments, even those that could not have existed at the time of the invention. Other opinions apply claim construction doctrines to limit a patent holder's reach only to embodiments that could have existed at the time of the invention. Still others use a different set of doctrines to conclude that a patent holder's reach sometimes can includes things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention and sometimes not.

Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), on the grounds that the resulting doctrine does not reflect the realities of scientific contribution).

68. For the purposes of this Article, I refer to the time of the invention. One could further consider, however, whether the proper moment for measuring the time of the invention is the moment of creation or the moment of the patent application.

69. See infra Part III.A.1.

70. See infra Part III.A.2.

71. See infra Part III.A.3.
1. The One Embodiment Doctrine Applied Broadly

For example, the *Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.* decision in 2002 held broadly that one embodiment of an invention brings rights to all embodiments of the invention, even those beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.\(^{72}\) The *Hoechst* case concerned erythropoietin ("EPO"), a hormone that occurs naturally in the body and controls the formation of red blood cells, which transport oxygen from the lungs to other parts of the body.\(^{73}\) An insufficient amount of red blood cells in the blood can occur as a result of chronic kidney disease or heart disease, from the effects of chemotherapy to treat cancer, and from other causes.\(^{74}\) Increasing EPO in a patient's system can help raise the level of red blood cells.\(^{75}\) Early attempts to obtain EPO for treating patients involved recovering EPO from surplus human blood or urine. The approach was complicated and yielded only small amounts of EPO that were very impure and highly unstable.\(^{76}\)

Instead of purifying EPO from blood and urine, the patent holder in *Hoechst* used genetic engineering techniques to produce large amounts of the hormone.\(^{77}\) The patent holder used information from the relevant protein—the hormone EPO—to predict and create small DNA pieces, which could be used to fish out the entire DNA sequence necessary for producing EPO.\(^{78}\) Having isolated the full sequence, the patent holder transferred it into a circular piece of carrier DNA. The carrier DNA was then transferred into Chinese hamster ovary cells which could churn out large amounts of EPO.\(^{79}\) The patent holder received a patent covering a variety of claims including a claim to "non-naturally occurring" EPO.\(^{80}\)

 Rather than the traditional recombinant techniques used by the patent holder, the second inventor in *Hoechst* used a different approach to obtain large amounts of EPO. The second inventor, in essence, figured out how to spike the start and stop mechanisms that control the production of EPO in

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\(^{72}\) *Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.*, 314 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

\(^{73}\) *Id.* at 1321.

\(^{74}\) *See id.*

\(^{75}\) *See id.*

\(^{76}\) *Id.*

\(^{77}\) *See id.*

\(^{78}\) *See U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933* (filed June 7, 1995).

\(^{79}\) *Hoechst*, 314 F.3d at 1321.

\(^{80}\) *Id.* at 1322.
The inventor then used human cells in the lab to produce large amounts of EPO that could be administered to patients.

The Federal Circuit considered whether the second inventor infringed the first inventor's patent, which had been based on recombinant DNA techniques. The court found infringement, choosing the broad notion of one embodiment. In particular, the court held that the first inventor's claims covered any EPO other than the way nature intended it, and were not limited to EPO produced from any particular source or by any particular method. The court held further that for such product claims, the inventor did not need to describe or enable technology that arises after the patent application. The court cited with approval the lower court's conclusion that "the specification's failure to disclose the later-developed . . . technology cannot invalidate the patent. . . . [T]he law makes clear that the specification need teach only one mode of making and using a claimed composition." In short, the Hoechst court allowed the footprint of the invention to cover things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.

2. Claim Construction

In contrast to the approach embraced by the Federal Circuit in Hoechst, other Federal Circuit opinions have limited the forward reach of the patent. For example, the Federal Circuit in Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc. used claim construction to limit the footprint of the patent to things known at the time of the patent application.

The Schering case concerned proteins known as interferons that occur naturally in the body and play an important role in fighting viruses and tumors. At the time of the invention, scientists knew of only two types of interferons, those produced by leukocytes and those produced by fibroblasts. Leukocytes are white blood cells, while fibroblasts are a
common cell type found in connective tissue. The patent holder filed claims related broadly to leukocyte interferons, that is, any interferon produced by white cells.

Interferons, however, turned out to have many more subtypes than originally known, varying according to the strength of the activity they engage in, the type of activity they engage in, and the type of receptors they bind to. Thus, the term “leukocyte interferon” covered many subtypes beyond the one that the patent holder had manipulated in his experiments.

As information about the various subtypes came to light, a committee of scientists adopted new terminology to describe interferons according to factors such as the type of cell that produces them, their binding affinity, and certain physical properties. Following the nomenclature change, the inventor amended his patent application to remove the term “leukocyte interferons” and substitute the term interferons of the “IFN-α type.” At the time of the amendment, however, even the term “IFN-α” included numerous subtypes of interferons that differed from the one that the inventor had isolated and manipulated successfully.

The Federal Circuit panel in Schering expressed admiration for the patent holder’s invention, describing the experiments as “elegant” and the work as “pioneering.” Nevertheless, the court limited the reach of the invention, confining it to the limits of scientific knowledge at the time of the patent application.

To reach its limiting result, the Federal Circuit panel used doctrines related to claim construction. Traditionally, patent cases begin with an examination of the meaning of the terms in the patent. Words in the patent are parsed to try to divine their precise definition in the context of the patent. This determination, known as claim construction, proceeds as a

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89. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1284.
90. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1350. The patent holder successfully isolated the gene that codes for an interferon, creating recombinant molecules that contained the genes and could be transferred to host cells to continue producing the desired interferon. The patent claimed recombinant molecules that contain the gene and genetically engineered microorganisms that contain such molecules. See id. at 1350–51.
92. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1352. See also Al-Hasso, supra note 91.
93. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353–54.
94. See id. at 1349.
95. See id. at 1353 (finding that the term in the patent could not enlarge the patent’s scope to include technology arising after its filing).
matter of law. The relevant hearings are called "Markman hearings," after the 1996 Supreme Court case holding that claim construction does not reside within the purview of the jury. Thus, claim construction issues are decided by the trial judge, and appellate courts review such issues de novo without deference to the trial court's decision. Once the patent claims have been construed, those accused of infringing the patent generally defend along two lines of argument: (1) that the claims are invalid, or (2) that the accused product does not infringe the claims as interpreted.

Claim construction was the sole issue on appeal in Schering. In the process of defining the claim terms, the court declared that claim terms are not permitted to embrace technology arising after the patent application. The court found that "[t]he term as used in the . . . patent . . . did not and could not enlarge the scope of the patent to embrace technology arising after its filing." With this simple declaration, the court limited the footprint of the invention to the state of the art at the time of the application. In essence, the court limited the reach of the invention, freezing it to include only scientific knowledge available when the application was filed.

The Schering court did not directly address the theoretical question of how far the footprint of the patent should extend and why we might make that choice. Rather, the court accomplished the limitation indirectly in its application of the rules of claim construction. Having declared that claim terms cannot reach forward to things arising after the application, the court proceeded to save the claim by reading limitations into it, adopting an inspired interpretation.

Both the terms used in the original claim and in the amended claim appeared to include subtypes discovered after the time of the invention, which the court had suggested was problematic. Normally, words in a claim should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning in the art at

99. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1349 (noting that the plaintiff appeals only the district court's claim construction).
100. Id. at 1353.
101. Id.
the time. A court may overlook the ordinary meaning of a term, however, if the patent applicant expressly designates a particular definition for the term. In amending his patent, the Schering applicant stated that “[i]n this application the interferon nomenclature announced in Nature... is used. E.g., leukocyte interferon is designated IFN-α.” The court read this sentence from the amendment as expressing a broad intent to limit the claim to what was known at the time of the invention.

This interpretation is somewhat strained. The declaration in the amendment stops far short of declaring a limitation on the ordinary meaning of terms. It is a substantial leap to conclude that the act of narrowing the size of a group is the same as expressly limiting the claim to what could have been known at the time of the invention. More importantly, although the applicant narrowed the group, he still chose a group larger than what was known at the time of the invention. Thus, it is difficult to understand how choosing a group that reaches beyond what was known at the time of the invention evidences an intent to limit the claim to what was known at the time of the invention.

Nevertheless, the court interpreted that sentence as expressly limiting the claims to the specific science and knowledge at the time of the invention. The court, therefore, found a way to declare that the terms did not mean what they said, and that the claim was limited only to subtypes that could have been known at the time of the invention. In the process, the court suggested something about the proper footprint of the patent. The opinion suggested that as scientists discover and distinguish variations of the product, the footprint should be limited to the science at the time of the invention. This approach stands in contrast with the opinion delivered three years later in Hoechst, which embraces the broad notion of one embodiment and allows the patent holder to reach embodiments and variations beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.

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103. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353.
104. Id. at 1352 (internal citation omitted).
105. See id. at 1353 (finding that the patentee expressly limited the meaning of the term IFN-α to define only the leukocyte interferon described in the original application).
106. At the time of the amendment, scientists already knew that IFN-α itself had subtypes beyond what had been known at the time of the invention. Even the Nature article cited in the amendment mentions subtypes of IFN-α interferons. See id. at 1352–53.
3. Disclosure Doctrines

In contrast to both *Hoechst* and *Schering*, the decision in *Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc.* used a different set of doctrines to address a patent holder's ability to reach embodiments that could not have been known at the time of the invention. Applying these doctrines, *Chiron* suggested a definition of the footprint of the invention that is inconsistent with both of the prior cases.

The *Chiron* case concerned claims to monoclonal antibodies used in the treatment and diagnosis of breast cancer. As described above, antibodies are Y-shaped proteins that defend the human body against harmful agents, such as viruses and toxins, by binding with such agents and interfering with their activity. We generally refer to such harmful agents as antigens.

About twenty-five percent of breast cancer tumors express unusually high levels of a protein named Her2. This fact suggests that Her2 plays a role in sustaining the development of the cancerous cells. By blocking the activity of Her2, scientists hope to prevent the growth of the cancerous cells that may depend on it. In particular, breast cancer patients may benefit from doses of antibodies that bind to and interfere with Her2.

The challenge for scientists is producing a sufficient supply of stable antibodies that the human body can accept. As described above, antibodies vary in terms of where they bind to an agent, the way in which they interact with the agent, and the effectiveness of that interaction. Monoclonal antibodies, however, are created using populations of identical cells that are developed to secrete a single type of antibody. Given that a single

108. *See id.* at 1250.
112. *See id.*
113. *See id.*
115. *See supra text accompanying note 91.
antibody is produced, the antibody will bind to a specific site on an antigen and interact with the antigen in a consistent manner.  

The science of producing antibodies advanced dramatically in 1975 with the development of hybridomas. Ordinarily, the immune system cells that produce antibodies have a limited life span in the lab. Thus, although a population of homogenous cells producing a single antibody could be developed, the cells would die out, making it difficult to produce large amounts of a single, consistent antibody. Hybridoma technology, which involves fusing the desired immune cells with tumor cells, creates the capacity to replicate indefinitely.

Early antibody populations were produced from hybridomas using mouse cells. Such antibodies could not be administered long-term to humans because the patient’s immune system would eventually attack the mouse antibodies, risking toxic shock or death. In response, scientists turned to antibodies created from DNA encoding materials combined from different species. In other words, the arms of the Y antibody may be created by genetic coding regions from a mouse while the tail of the Y may be created by genetic coding regions from a human. Antibodies created in this combined fashion are called “chimeric” antibodies. “Humanized” antibodies are created predominantly from human genetic coding materials, although they may contain some nonhuman portions.

The patent holder in Chiron produced monoclonal antibodies that bind to the human breast cancer antigen Her2. The original application disclosed one antibody, prepared using a hybridoma developed from mice. Later versions of the application disclosed additional monoclonal antibodies that also bind to Her2, again produced by other hybridomas developed from mice. Some of the variations revealed in the later versions of the application had binding affinities for different locations on Her2.

117. See Alberts et al., supra note 53, at 476.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id., supra note 53, at 476.
121. See id. at 1251.
122. See id. at 1250.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1251.
127. See id. at 1251–52.
128. See id.
The patent claimed all monoclonal antibodies that bind to Her2. The patent defined "monoclonal antibody" in the application as not limited in regards to the source or manner in which it is made. In other words, the product of the patent application was defined as all antibodies that bind to the Her2 target, no matter how the antibody is derived, as long as it is derived other than the way in which nature intended.

The patent holder sued a company making a product called "Herceptin," a humanized antibody used in the long-term treatment of breast cancer. Neither chimeric nor humanized antibodies existed at the time of the original patent application. Thus, the patent holder was attempting to extend the footprint of the patent to embodiments beyond the state of the art at the time of the patent application.

In analyzing the claim, the Federal Circuit chose an entirely different path than either of the paths taken before. The Hoechst court refused to limit a patent holder's reach to embodiments that could have existed at the time of the patent, remaining faithful to the one embodiment notion. The Schering court did limit a patent holder's reach and used claim construction doctrines to accomplish that limitation. The Chiron court also limited a patent holder's reach, but not by claim construction. Rather, the Chiron court limited a patent holder's reach using disclosure doctrines.

As described above, patent cases begin with an inquiry into the meaning of the words in the claims. Once claim construction is completed, an accused infringer generally proceeds by claiming that the patent is invalid and that the accused product does not infringe. To establish validity, a patent holder traditionally must show proper subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and proper disclosure. The Chiron court chose to limit the footprint of the patent using doctrines related to proper disclosure.

Disclosure is governed by § 112 of the Patent Act. This section provides that the patent shall contain "a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly

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129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id. Although the case did not discuss this aspect of the claim, presumably the claim was intended to reach all antibodies that bind to Her2 regardless of their binding location or method of interaction with Her2.
132. See id. at 1252.
133. See id. at 1251.
134. See generally MUELLER, supra note 97 (describing each element).
connected, to make and use the same.” The disclosure requirement is the patent holder’s payment in the bargain of granting a patent. The government confers patent rights for a limited time in anticipation that society later will receive the full benefit of the knowledge of those inventions. Disclosure guarantees that society receives the benefit of the patent holder’s knowledge.

In addition, early cases suggested that the disclosure requirements of § 112 and its predecessors not only guaranteed society’s proper reward, but also served to notify others of the rights claimed. More recent cases have expanded the role of § 112 from explanation and notice to determining whether the inventor possessed the invention claimed. To accomplish this expansion, the Federal Circuit in 1997 in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. identified within the disclosure language of § 112 two separate requirements, one for enablement and one for written description. Enablement would continue to ensure that the public has sufficient information to understand and practice the invention, while written description would ensure that patent applicants possessed what they wished to claim.

The new written description test is couched in terms of performing an accurate accounting of what the inventor actually possessed and when. A court, however, cannot determine what an inventor possessed at a given time without making assumptions about how far a particular invention can reach. The new written description jurisprudence, therefore, has become the battleground for indirect struggles over how far a patent holder can reach. It is within this context that the Chiron court uses written description to reduce the footprint of the patent for biotechnology inventions.

In Chiron, the patent holder tried to reach embodiments of the invention that could not have been accomplished at the time of the patent

136. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 219 (1832) (noting that description ensures that after the privilege expires, the public receives the benefit for which the privilege was granted).
139. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
141. See id. at 926 (defending the current written description doctrine).
143. See Feldman, supra note 138, at 51.
application.\textsuperscript{144} The appeal centered on whether the patent holder’s original application satisfied § 112.\textsuperscript{145} On this question, the court faced precedent from the cases of \textit{In re Hogan}\textsuperscript{146} and \textit{Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.}\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{Hogan} was decided by the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit and concerned an invention in the field of chemistry.\textsuperscript{148} Although the original patent application in \textit{Hogan} was filed in 1953, amendments and continuations reached across two decades, with the PTO finally rejecting the version of the application submitted in 1971.\textsuperscript{149} Under the Patent Act, an applicant can amend its patent but may not add any new matter to the application.\textsuperscript{150}

In its rejection, the PTO objected that later incarnations of the application included versions of the original chemical that could not have existed decades before when the original application was filed.\textsuperscript{151} Thus, the PTO objected on the ground that the rights sought reached far beyond the invention as defined in the original disclosure of the patent.\textsuperscript{152}

In reversing the PTO, the \textit{Hogan} court held that a patent applicant need not enable later developed technology, arguing that such a limitation would place an intolerable burden on a patent holder’s ability to claim broadly.\textsuperscript{153} With this approach, the \textit{Hogan} court embraced a broad view of the footprint of a patent, allowing the reach to extend to embodiments beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.

Grappling with the \textit{Hogan} language twenty-five years later, a Federal Circuit panel in \textit{Plant Genetic Systems} suggested that \textit{Hogan} itself could be limited.\textsuperscript{154} As the court explained, “We do not read \textit{Hogan} as allowing an inventor to claim what was specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed, unless the patent discloses how to make and use it.”\textsuperscript{155}

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\textsuperscript{144} See \textit{Chiron}, 363 F.3d at 1251.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Id.} at 1252 (framing the case as an appeal from determinations concerning written description and enablement).
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{In re Hogan}, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.}, 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
\textsuperscript{148} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Id.} at 597.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{In re Hogan}, 559 F.2d at 600.
\textsuperscript{152} See \textit{id.} at 600–01.
\textsuperscript{153} See \textit{id.} at 606.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Plant Genetic Sys.}, 315 F.3d at 1340–41.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.} at 1340.
\end{small}
holders do not have to enable embodiments completely unknown at the time of the patent, but must enable embodiments that were desired but difficult to obtain at the time of the patent.156

This reading of Hogan attempts to rein in a broad footprint that would allow patent holders to reach forward to embodiments that could not have been known at the time of the invention. After all, by reading Hogan in this fashion, the court changed the law from allowing patent holders to reach all embodiments beyond the state of the art to reaching only some embodiments beyond the state of the art. The limitation, however, has a perverse effect. In designing a coherent vision of the footprint of the invention, one would expect to reduce a patent holder’s reach as technology advances farther away from what was known at the time of the patent. The more the science advances, the more we would anticipate that new products are substantially different from what the patent holder accomplished and, therefore, should not be covered by the patent. Thus, we would expect to create the strongest limits on a patent holder’s reach for embodiments that are the farthest from the state of the art at the time of the invention.

The Plant Genetic Systems limitation, however, has the opposite effect. A patent holder’s reach is most clearly protected in the case of advancements that are beyond anyone’s imagination at the time of the invention. The patent holder’s reach is denied for technology that is closer to the art at the time. Thus, the patent holder has more control over things vastly beyond the state of the art and less control for things close to the state of the art. This is the opposite of the effect that one would logically impose because courts again are looking for stop-gap measures to limit a patent holder’s reach, rather than developing a comprehensive view of what should be protected.

Plant Genetic Systems suggested that a patent holder’s ability to reach beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention could be limited through the enablement doctrine. Two months later, the Chiron court followed Plant Genetic Systems, finding that patent holders are required to enable some, but not all, embodiments beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.157

The Chiron court went further, however, in its application of the written description doctrine. Regarding written description, the Chiron court ruled that the patent holder could not possibly have described what

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156. See id.
did not exist in the art at the time of the invention.\textsuperscript{158} Thus, the \textit{Chiron} court ruled that patent holders who try to reach to embodiments beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention will fail on written description grounds, even if they survive enablement. At the end of the day in \textit{Chiron}, therefore, patent holders can \textit{never} reach embodiments beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention. The case, however, adopts a number of strange twists to reach that result and stands in contradiction to other cases.

The author of the \textit{Chiron} opinion, Judge Rader, has railed against the Federal Circuit’s elevation of written description to the level of a separate test in \textsection 112 jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{159} In fact, Judge Rader continued his strenuous objections a few months after \textit{Chiron} in his dissent from the Federal Circuit’s refusal to take a written description case en banc.\textsuperscript{160} In particular, Judge Rader argued that the Federal Circuit’s current separation of written description and enablement leaves juries with the cumbersome task of deciding that “the patent’s disclosure can enable a skilled artisan to make and practice the entire invention, but still not inform that same artisan that the inventor was in possession of the invention.”\textsuperscript{161} Nevertheless, the separation of written description and enablement was a happy circumstance for Judge Rader in \textit{Chiron}, providing the vehicle for blunting the impact of \textit{Hogan}.

Regardless of the technical conflicts concerning how the written description doctrine operates or how it fits with the enablement doctrine, the more serious conflicts are theoretical. Across a broad range of doctrines, the courts have adopted entirely inconsistent visions of the proper footprint of the invention and how far an inventor can reach toward things that come after the invention. The \textit{Hoechst} court suggested broadly that a patent holder can reach to all embodiments, including those that could not have existed at the time of the invention. The \textit{Schering} court suggested through claim construction that a patent holder \textit{cannot} reach to things that could not have existed at the time of the invention. The \textit{Hogan} court suggested through enablement that a patent holder \textit{can} reach to unknown embodiments. The \textit{Plant Genetic Systems} suggested through enablement that a patent holder could reach some, but not all embodiments

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{See id.} at 1255 (finding that the patent holder could not have described antibodies beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention).


\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Moba,} 325 F.3d at 1323.
that could not have existed at the time of the invention. Finally, the Chiron
court suggested through written description that a patent holder cannot
reach any embodiments that could not have been known at the time of the
invention.

B. HOW FAR CAN A PATENT HOLDER REACH TOWARD EARLIER
CREATIONS?

The section above described how defining an invention to include
things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention has led to
chaos in the doctrines concerning how far a patent holder can reach toward
later inventions. The same expansive notion is wreaking havoc in doctrines
related to how far a patent holder can reach toward earlier creations,
whether created by nature or by other inventors.

Ordinarily, a patent applicant’s reach is constrained by prior art.
Patents are granted only for new inventions, not for things that are already
available in the science. If an invention already exists, it is not novel, but
rather “anticipated by the prior art.”

Traditionally, to argue that a current invention was anticipated by
prior art, one had to point to a single piece of prior art and find all of the
elements of the current invention within the four corners of that prior art.
Courts have broadened the classic definition of anticipation, however, to
include references to what a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand. Thus, even when a piece of prior art does not describe a
particular element of the claimed invention, the prior art may still anticipate
if a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the prior art
reference to include the element. Therefore, if a person of skill in the art
would have understood the element to be included in the prior art, the prior
art anticipates.

163. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 31, § 3.02[1].
165. Similarly, although the test for anticipation requires a single reference and should not
combine prior references, a court may look at additional references to interpret what a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand. See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d
1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that recourse to extrinsic evidence is permissible to determine if a
feature is necessarily present, even if not discussed). Understandably, courts have experienced some
difficulty in distinguishing between the use of extrinsic evidence to explain a piece of prior art, which is
permissible, and combining two pieces of prior art, which is not. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 31, §
3.02[1][d] n.26 (citing discussion of this dilemma in the case of Fenton Golf Trust v. Cobra Golf, Inc.,
No. 97 C 247, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452 (N.D. Ill. 1998)).
Some opinions broaden the anticipation standard even farther, finding that a prior art reference can anticipate if the necessary element is inherent in the prior invention, even if those of ordinary skill in the art could not have recognized the element.\textsuperscript{166} This interpretation expands the definition of anticipation beyond what one skilled in the art would know to things that are entirely unknown but contained in the invention.

For example, in \textit{Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.}, the court found that anticipation by prior art does not require recognition as long as the necessary element is inherent in the prior invention.\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Geneva} concerned a patented antihistamine that is the active ingredient in the popular allergy medicine, Claritin.\textsuperscript{168} Unlike the other antihistamines that were available at the time of the invention, the Claritin antihistamine did not cause drowsiness.\textsuperscript{169}

Six years after receiving the patent on the Claritin antihistamine, the patent holder also received a patent on DCL, a metabolite of its antihistamine.\textsuperscript{170} A metabolite is a compound formed in a patient’s body. As a patient's body digests, or metabolizes, a medicine, the medicine is chemically converted into a new compound, known as a metabolite.\textsuperscript{171}

Scholars have expressed concern over patent holders' attempts to refresh their patents by patenting updated versions, alternative delivery methods, or other variations of the original product. This practice is referred to as "evergreening,"\textsuperscript{172} and one could argue that patenting metabolites is a form of evergreening.

When the patent on the Claritin antihistamine expired, generic versions entered the market. The patent holder sued the generics on the

\textsuperscript{166} See, e.g., \textit{Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc.}, 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); \textit{In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.}, 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); \textit{MEHL/ Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgram}, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also \textit{CHISUM}, supra note 31, § 3.03[2][c].

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Geneva}, 339 F.3d at 1373.

\textsuperscript{168} See id. at 1375.

\textsuperscript{169} Id.

\textsuperscript{170} See id. at 1375–76 (explaining that the antihistamine patent issued in 1981, while the metabolite patent issued in 1987).

\textsuperscript{171} See id. at 1375.

grounds that although the antihistamine patent had expired, the generics infringed the metabolite patent, which still had six years to go.  

The court had to determine whether the metabolite patent was invalid because of prior art. The relevant prior art was the original Claritin antihistamine. Thus, the key question concerned whether an invention is anticipated by prior art if the element is present in the operation of the prior art, despite the fact that those skilled in the prior art would not have recognized it.  

The *Geneva* court found that anticipation by prior art does not require recognition. In other words, a prior art reference can anticipate if all elements are contained in the prior art, even if a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to recognize the disputed element as part of the invention. Thus, the antihistamine anticipated the metabolite because the metabolite compound was inherently formed during the operation of the antihistamine invention, even though those of ordinary skill in the art did not know of this at the time of the antihistamine patent.

Another Federal Circuit panel reached a similar conclusion in *In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation*. *Cruciferous* concerned a patent for a method of lowering the risk of developing cancer by selecting for particular vegetable seeds that would grow plants containing high levels of substances thought to reduce the risk of developing cancer. The substances, glucosinolates, encourage the body to produce certain enzymes that are part of the body's mechanism for detoxifying agents that have the potential to cause cancer. The inventors recognized that the amount of the desired substances varies from one broccoli plant to another. The inventors, therefore, suggested sorting through the seeds of particular plants to select those that will produce high levels of the desired substances and assembling them into a food product to reduce cancer in humans and

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173. *See Geneva*, 339 F.3d at 1375–76 (describing the timing of the patents and identifying the patent at issue in the suit).
174. *See id.* at 1376.
175. *See id.*
176. *See id.* at 1377.
177. *See id.* (finding that "at the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art").
178. *See id.* (holding that "recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date of the [metabolite] patent is not required to show anticipation by inherency").
179. *In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.*, 301 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
180. *See id.* at 1345.
181. *See id.*
182. *See id.*
animals. The patent claimed a new method for treating cancer, not a new method for growing or harvesting sprouts.

The Federal Circuit panel found that the invention was anticipated by the prior art of harvesting this class of vegetables for general human consumption. The patent holder tried to argue that even if the prior art included eating your vegetables, nothing in the art identified the particular vegetables with the desired substances or suggested assembling a food product from the cultivated seeds that contained particularly high quantities of the substance.

The court, however, concluded that all of the invention was inherent in the prior art. A person eating vegetables would have eaten some vegetables with high quantities of the desired substances. Thus, there was nothing new in directing people to do something that had been done before. As the court explained, "[The patent holder] cannot credibly maintain that no one has heretofore grown and eaten one of the many suitable [particular seeds] identified by its patents."

The court ruled, therefore, that prior art can anticipate even if those of ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized the inherent characteristics or functions. "Stated differently, a sprout's glucosinolate content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential are inherent characteristics of the sprout. It matters not that those of ordinary skill heretofore may not have recognized these inherent characteristics of the sprouts."

As described above, the classic test for finding that an invention is anticipated by the prior art requires that a single piece of art contain all elements of the claimed invention. Courts have eased this requirement by consideration of what a person skilled in the art would have understood as inherent in the invention. The Geneva and Cruciferous cases ease the requirement even further by finding that a prior art reference can anticipate if the necessary elements are inherent in the invention, even if one skilled in the art would not have recognized or appreciated those elements.

183. See id.
184. Id. at 1345-46 (describing the patent claim); id. at 1350 (noting that the patent holder "does not claim to have invented a new kind of sprout, or a new way of growing or harvesting sprouts").
185. See id. at 1351 (noting that the prior art teaches sprouting and harvesting the very same seeds that the patents recognize as producing vegetables rich in the desired substance).
186. See id. at 1349.
187. See id. at 1349-50.
188. Id. at 1351.
189. See id. at 1350.
190. Id. at 1350 (internal citation omitted).
Not all Federal Circuit panels, however, embrace the view that prior art can anticipate even if those skilled in the art would not have recognized the elements. Some Federal Circuit decisions have held, to the contrary, that prior art can anticipate only if the element or characteristic would have been recognized by those skilled in the art. 191

The notion that an invention encompasses things inherent but unknown is consistent with the one embodiment concept. In both concepts, the footprint of the invention is defined broadly to include things beyond the state of knowledge at the time of the invention. With the inherency cases, Federal Circuit opinions again struggle with the implications of applying such a wide footprint, with some cases ruling that prior art includes things unrecognized in the arts and others declining to do so.

Within the opinions that allow inherency for unknown elements, one can see an instinct to limit what can be patented by expanding the notion of prior art. In *Cruciferous*, for example, the court denied patent coverage by finding that the invention existed inherently in common activities. 192 In *Geneva*, the court denied patent coverage by finding that the invention existed inherently in the applicant's own prior inventions. 193 This suggests an effort to limit the ability of inventors to lock up rights by granting a large footprint to what has come before.

This approach, however, eventually expands what can be patented rather than limiting it. If the definition of a piece of prior art includes unknown elements, then the inventor holding the patent on that piece of prior art should be able to define the invention to reach those unknown elements as well. After all, an invention is what an invention is. Why define an invention one way for one set of doctrines and another way for another set of doctrines?

Altering the inherency doctrine so that prior inventions are defined to include elements beyond what those in the art recognize creates an

191. See ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that to anticipate, a prior art reference must describe with sufficient clarity that the subject matter was recognized by persons of ordinary skill in the art); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that a disclosure may anticipate by inherency when it would be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art); Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also 1 CHISUM, supra note 31, § 3.03[2][c] (noting that Federal Circuit opinions have oscillated on the question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art must recognize the existence of an inherent feature of prior art). *Cf. In re Seaborg*, 328 F.2d 996, 998-99 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (finding lack of anticipation because the claimed product, if produced in the prior art process, was produced in such miniscule amounts and under such conditions that its presence was undetectable).

192. See *In re Cruciferous Sprout*, 301 F.3d at1351-52.

expansive reach for all patent holders. Thus, an effort to rein in patenting in some cases has the perverse effect of expanding the footprint of patents in general.

In short, the inherency doctrine suggests defining an invention to include things beyond the knowledge of the inventor or the state of the art at the time of the invention. Although this arises in the context of how far an inventor can reach toward prior inventions, logically it should also apply in the context of how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions. In fact, a recent Federal Circuit opinion made this logical connection. The opinion takes inherency questions, in other words, those related to how far an inventor can reach toward earlier inventions, and links them to the doctrines concerning how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions. Thus, the opinion confirms the inextricable link between defining an invention for the purposes of delineating prior art and defining an invention for the purposes of delineating future art.

Specifically, in *Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research*, a Federal Circuit panel found that when anticipation is based on inherency, the information must have been known in the art. This opinion, therefore, followed the line of cases denying inherency for unknown elements, in contrast to cases such as *Cruciferous* and *Geneva*. Following publication of the opinion, the full Federal Circuit initially agreed to rehear the case en banc. The court withdrew the en banc order, however, when the panel reissued the opinion avoiding the question of whether inherency must be recognizable.

The original panel opinion had upheld the patent, adopting a narrow view of prior art by finding that prior art cannot anticipate unless the elements are recognized. The reissued opinion similarly upheld the patent but avoided all discussion of inherency. Rather, in the reissued opinion, the court found that prior art does not anticipate if the prior art is not enabled.

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195. *See id.* at 1228.


198. *See Elan Pharm. I*, 304 F.3d at 1228.

199. *See Elan Pharm. III*, 346 F.3d at 1054. This holding fits logically with enablement’s traditional role of ensuring that an inventor adequately teaches those skilled in the art how to practice
Although the final Elan opinion pursued a perfectly logical connection, the opinion makes the circle of confusion in this area complete. First, the results in Elan conflict with the cases finding that anticipation does not require recognition. Under those cases, prior art with unrecognized qualities anticipates, while under Elan, prior art with unrecognized qualities does not anticipate. The Federal Circuit cannot solve the conflicts in the inherency doctrine by deflecting questions into another doctrine. The results are still in conflict, in terms of whether the footprint of the invention can reach back to cover prior unrecognized elements.

Second, current conflicts within the enablement doctrine itself will lead to further confusion on the question of whether an inventor can reach back toward unrecognized elements. As described above, the enablement doctrine is itself in disarray in terms of whether an inventor can reach things that could not have been known at the time of the invention. Hoechst and Hogan hold that an inventor need not enable information that could not have been known at the time of the invention, while Chiron and Plant Genetic Systems hold that an inventor must enable some but not all of such information. Tossing the inherency question into that realm places it at the center of opinions that point in different directions and guarantees further confusion.

Finally, if a prior art reference must satisfy the enablement doctrine in order to anticipate, then it must also satisfy written description. If a prior art reference must be described to anticipate, then the conflicts throughout both sets of doctrines will be complete. The same question of whether an inventor can reach back to unrecognized elements would be decided in a variety of ways depending upon which doctrinal box the court uses to frame the question and which line of cases the court follows. If decided based on inherency, some cases would find that the prior art anticipated even though there was no recognition in the art, and some would find the opposite. If decided based on enablement, some cases would suggest that the prior art may anticipate despite lack of knowledge by those skilled in the art, and others would disagree with this proposition. Still others

the invention. If a patent reference, for example, serves to bring something into the prior art so that future inventors cannot claim it, then that reference must actually teach those skilled in the art how to accomplish the invention. See id. at 1056–57.

200. See supra Part III.A.

201. See supra notes 165–89, 194–99 and accompanying text.

would suggest that the prior art may anticipate only if there is total lack of
knowledge by those skilled in the art, but not if the level of knowledge is
such that the element was desired but difficult to obtain.204

If decided based on written description, some cases would suggest that
the prior art may anticipate despite lack of knowledge by those skilled in
the art,205 while others would suggest that this is not the case.206 And again,
one case would suggest prior art may anticipate only if there is total lack of
knowledge by those skilled in the art but not if the level of knowledge is
such that the element was desired but difficult to obtain.207 Those who hold
patents or challenge them could be assured only of a complete inability to
predict the answer to the question.

Most importantly, the convergence of these areas demonstrates the
futility of addressing the issue piecemeal. The courts cannot simply
resolve, for example, whether inherency includes unrecognized elements.
Any decision there, no matter what, leaves conflicts in the areas of written
description, claim construction, and enablement that will wrap back around
into the inherency inquiry.

The temptation to define prior art as including inherent elements is
strong. It provides the instant gratification of shutting down certain types of
evergreening such as metabolite claims.208 That satisfaction, however,
comes at the cost of exacerbating chaos across the doctrines. In addition,
there are other approaches available for reining in those who would extend
their patents through metabolite claims.209

From another perspective, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley suggest that
the inherency cases can be understood differently from the way in which
they are currently interpreted in the field.210 According to Burk and
Lemley, the cases actually turn on whether society is already using and

204. See, e.g., Chiron, 363 F.3d 1247; Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
205. See, e.g., Hoechst, 314 F.3d 1313.
207. Chiron, 363 F.3d 1247.
208. See Derzko, supra note 172, at 221 (noting that the court's holding in Schering Corp. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. will eliminate some types of metabolite claims and that to the extent
metabolite claims constitute evergreening, the case will dampen incentives for certain forms of
evergreening).
210. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at 3, on file with author) (arguing that confusion in inherency law is unnecessary
given that the facts of inherency cases offer a simple way to understand them).
receiving the benefit of an element, not whether the element was unrecognized. In other words, the rule should be that if the public already benefits from an invention, even if they do not know about it, that invention is inherent in the prior art.

The public use and benefit rule has the advantage of threading a line carefully through some of the trickier inherency cases. Problems with the approach emerge, however, when doctrines throughout the area are considered as a whole.

For example, recall that in Geneva, a pharmaceutical company tried to extend its patent on a drug by patenting the compound formed by the patient’s body when the drug was digested. The public use and benefit rule would deny a patent on the compound. The theory would be that the compound was already being formed in the body, and the public, at least those taking the drug, already had the benefit of it.

The pharmaceutical company’s invention, however, looks very much like many of the gene and protein inventions that commonly receive patents. For example, the pharmaceutical company determined that the body formed a substance. The company isolated and purified the substance, identified its structure and biologic properties, and then applied for a patent on the substance. Many patents for genes and proteins are based on the same type of work. An inventor determines that the body forms a substance, a protein, for example. The inventor isolates and purifies the substance, identifies its structure, determines a use, and then applies for a patent on the substance.

Although such protein patents are routinely granted, the logic of the public use and benefit rule would deny patenting under the circumstances. After all, the production of the protein is inherent in the prior art of the human body. People are already making, using, and receiving the benefit of the protein in their bodies, even if no one skilled in the art knows about it.

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211. Id. at 4.
212. Id. (outlining a proposed public benefit test).
213. For example, the rule forbids patenting a metabolite formed in the process of ingesting an earlier drug, but allows patenting a byproduct formed in the process of producing an earlier invention where the byproduct was discarded as a waste product. Compare id. at 11-12 (describing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), with id. at 5-6 (describing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880)), and id. at 14 (describing Edison Electric Light Co. v. Novelty Incandescent Lamp Co., 167 F. 977 (3d Cir. 1909)). Thus, the rule brings into harmony some difficult cases.
If the body's formation of the Schering metabolite leads to inherency, so should the body's formation of the protein. From the logic of the proposed rule, therefore, the protein, and an astounding array of other biospace inventions, would be unpatentable.216

The public use and benefit rule also suffers from the same problem as the broader inherency rule. Although the public use and benefit rule offers the prospect of reining in patent holders by limiting their ability to reach backward, it has the perverse effect of increasing their ability to reach forward.

Specifically, when examining a piece of prior art to decide whether a later invention is anticipated, the proposed rule would hold that the piece of art includes things inherently in use, even if no one knows about those things. If that piece of prior art is something on which another inventor holds a patent,217 however, the inventor of that piece of prior art also should be able to claim that the invention includes things inherently in use. After all, how can we hold up a sphere and say, "When we look at it from one direction it is an apple, and when we look at it from another direction it is an orange"? Either the invention includes the unknown element or it does not.

Following the logic of the proposed rule, therefore, all inventions would reach to things inherently in use—even if those elements could not be recognized by anyone in the field and were not described or enabled by the inventor. This is a remarkably expansive view of the footprint of an invention.

We could, of course, draw artificial lines. We could declare that on the one hand, when an inventor creates something with unknown qualities and we are trying to determine the inventor's rights, then the invention does not reach those qualities. On the other hand, when an inventor creates something with unknown qualities and we are trying to determine the rights of other inventors, then the invention does reach those qualities. This approach is offered by Burk and Lemley to rationalize the asymmetries created by the proposed rule.218

216. Cf. id. at 994 (objecting to the rule that prior art can anticipate even as to unknown elements, and asking if the panel intends that no newly discovered product found in an organism can be patented).

217. Prior art can be something unpatented, such as a substance found in nature, but prior art is often something on which other inventors hold a patent.

218. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 210, at 27 (noting that the "result, while seemingly odd in its asymmetry, makes sense as a policy matter").
Along the same lines, we could determine that terms like "enablement" have slightly different meanings in different circumstances. This approach also is suggested by Burke and Lemley to wrestle with some of the additional conflicts in the doctrines.219

If we create different definitions that are to be applied when looking from different directions, however, these definitions are likely to wrap around and collide with each other. In fact, that is precisely what is happening now in the Federal Circuit as doctrines established in isolation expand and collide. Such collisions are bound to occur because conceptually, we are asking the same question: does the footprint of something that exists reach to things unknown?

Patent law can, and must, develop a consistent image of the footprint of an invention. Without that, we cannot hope to produce a coherent body of law that can be understood by inventors, judges, and juries alike. If we simply add greater twists and turns of complexity without resolving the conceptual question, we will do no more than exacerbate the current chaos in the doctrines.

IV. DEFINING THE FOOTPRINT

As described above, the Federal Circuit starts out on the path to chaos with cases like Hoechst and Hogan that allow patent holders to reach broadly into the unknown. Hoechst does this through general pronouncements of the reach of an invention as well as through specific applications of the enablement and written description rules.220 Hogan does this simply through application of the enablement rule.221

In later opinions, judges bob and weave, trying to avoid the implications of doctrines that lead to puzzling and uncomfortable results. Schering adopts a highly strained reading of the claims.222 Plant Genetic Systems crafts a strange line in which a patent holder can reach some, but not all, things unknown.223 The Chiron court echoes Plant Genetic Systems,

219. See id. at 17 (interpreting enablement cases to conclude that the standard for enablement is somewhat different in different circumstances).


222. See supra Part III.A.2.

223. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that a patent holder can reach things that could not have been contemplated in the art at the time of the invention, but not things desired but difficult to obtain).
but then uses another doctrine to completely eliminate a patent holder's ability to reach anything unknown.\textsuperscript{224}

Similar patterns emerge in the inherency cases concerning whether new inventions should be blocked by interpreting prior art to include things unknown.\textsuperscript{225} Some cases hold that prior art includes things unknown. Others disagree. Finally, the \textit{Elan} court tries to avoid the conflict by throwing prior art questions into the enablement doctrine.\textsuperscript{226}

The better path is to acknowledge that cases like \textit{Hoechst} and \textit{Hogan} are grounded in theories that are incompatible with the uncertain arts. Given how little we know about each biospace invention, granting rights to all embodiments, and everything contained therein, projects an enormous shadow across the future, one whose size cannot even be contemplated at the time of the invention.

For uncertain arts such as biotechnology, we should discard the notion that the basic definition of an invention includes things that could not have been known at the time of the invention. Rather, an invention should be defined in light of the art at the time.

Framing the inquiry in this way not only makes sense theoretically, it also enhances doctrinal coherence. After all, much of the current disarray has developed as courts strain against the sweeping implications of allowing biospace inventions to reach into unknown territory. Establishing that the basic definition of an invention arises in light of the art at the time of the invention can resolve the overt doctrinal conflicts as well as the more subtle inconsistencies.

This theoretical perspective would play out across the doctrines in the following manner: In claim construction, claims would be interpreted in light of the art at the time of the invention, and there would be no need for the type of strained interpretation applied in \textit{Schering}. Under the enablement and written description doctrines, a patent holder could not reach embodiments unknown at the time of the patent. This would eliminate the strange enablement rules in which a patent holder can reach to some but not all things unknown, rules that are then completely undone by certain versions of the written description doctrine. Finally, in the doctrine of inherency, a prior art reference could not anticipate if the

\textsuperscript{224} See supra notes 107–34 and accompanying text (describing the court's holding in \textit{Chiron} and noting its failure to follow \textit{Hoechst}).

\textsuperscript{225} See supra Part III.B.

element could not have been recognized by those skilled in the art at the time of the invention. In short, defining inventions in light of the state of the art at the time would resolve the surface inconsistencies, as well as the conflicting undercurrents described above.

This approach would not necessarily confine an inventor's rights precisely to what was done by the inventor. I am suggesting that patents should be interpreted in light of the art at the time, not that patents should be limited to the precise words and paths of the inventor. Thus, an inventor potentially could reach beyond the precise work completed to what could be accomplished given what scientists knew at the time of the invention. An inventor, however, could not reach to things that could not have been accomplished or were unknown in the art at the time.

A. SHOULD THE RULES BE THE SAME FOR THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS?

An inventor's rights are delineated not only by the footprint of the invention, but also by the doctrine of equivalents. With the doctrine of equivalents, a patent holder can argue that although the accused product is not what the patent holder created, it should, nonetheless, be considered equivalent. Although the current chaos involves doctrines related to defining an invention and determining whether an accused product directly infringes that invention, similar issues could arise under the doctrine of equivalents.

The doctrine of equivalents provides some breathing space to protect against those who make trivial changes that the patent holder could not have anticipated. It is a safety net, that as one scholar has noted, "holds out the possibility that, in rare but appropriate circumstances, courts may in essence redraw claim boundaries using information that was not available at the time of [the] patent prosecution." In particular, the courts stress that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied by asking whether each

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227. See Feldman, supra note 138, at 48 (arguing that disclosure may include things not directly expressed but known in the art at the time).


element of the accused product is the same or equivalent to each element of the patented product, not by looking at the products overall.\textsuperscript{231}

In this context, the Supreme Court has hinted that it might be receptive to considering unknown embodiments in a doctrine of equivalents inquiry. The suggestion appeared in \textit{Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.} in 2002.\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Festo} concerned a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents that prevents patent holders from reclaiming through equivalence what they gave up at the PTO in order to obtain a patent.\textsuperscript{233} The limitation, known as prosecution history estoppel, holds generally that a patentee’s decision to narrow claims through amendments at the PTO is presumed to be a general disclaimer of territory.\textsuperscript{234} That territory cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents.\textsuperscript{235}

In \textit{Festo}, the Supreme Court listed exceptions in which an amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent.\textsuperscript{236} The list of exceptions included circumstances in which the applicant could not have foreseen the development of the equivalent.\textsuperscript{237}

One could argue that the Supreme Court decision in \textit{Festo} should best be understood in the limited context of knowing relinquishment. The message of \textit{Festo} may be that a patent holder cannot be held responsible for \textit{knowing} relinquishment of something that the inventor could not have known about. Nevertheless, it could also be read as signaling the Court’s willingness to allow consideration of unknown embodiments in the limited context of a doctrine of equivalents analysis. Thus, \textit{Festo} at least raises the question of whether an inventor should be able to reach beyond the state of the art for the purposes of applying the doctrine of equivalents.

The doctrine of equivalents, however, is far too amorphous and uncertain to provide the necessary logic and clarity on this issue. Courts have failed to reach agreement on the verbal formulation of the test, let alone on how the test should be applied in various settings. For example, the test is described in some Federal Circuit cases as whether each element

\textsuperscript{231} See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40–41 (1997) (explaining that the defining principles of any doctrine of equivalents formulation would include a focus on individual elements and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements).


\textsuperscript{233} See \textit{id.} at 727.

\textsuperscript{234} See \textit{id.} at 723.

\textsuperscript{235} See \textit{id.} at 740–41.

\textsuperscript{236} \textit{Id.} at 740.

\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Id.}
of the accused device serves the same function, in the same way, to obtain the same result as the patented device.\textsuperscript{238} Other Federal Circuit cases describe the test as whether the differences between the two inventions are insubstantial.\textsuperscript{239} The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the debate, holding instead that different linguistic formulations may be suitable for different cases depending on the facts and leaving it to the Federal Circuit to refine the test in its sound judgment.\textsuperscript{240} The Federal Circuit has yet to meet the challenge, and it remains one of the most uncertain areas of patent law.

Any logic, clarity, and consistency created by limiting an invention to the state of the art at the time of the invention could be completely unraveled by revisiting the issue in the uncertain and undisciplined realm of the doctrine of equivalents.\textsuperscript{241} In its current form, therefore, the doctrine of equivalents could recreate chaos throughout this area of patent law if it is applied in more than rare circumstances.

V. CONCLUSION

Basic doctrines, carried over by analogy to mechanical inventions, would define an invention broadly to include embodiments and aspects of the invention that were unknown at the time of the invention. In fields of great uncertainty, however, we cannot define an invention to include the unknown without granting an extraordinarily expansive reach to inventors, far beyond what the inventor may have contributed. The temptation to restrain that reach has lead to strange doctrinal twists and an unworkable body of law.

In particular, across five disparate doctrines, current cases related to the footprint of a biospace invention pull in different theoretical directions and stand in contradiction to each other. Judges are unable to resolve the dilemmas because the basic theory underlining this doctrinal area is unsound.

To resolve these problems, we must establish a clear and consistent vision of the definition of an invention, one that can be understood by both

\textsuperscript{238} See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).


\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Cf.} Arriola, supra note 39, at 920 (noting commentators' concerns that the uncertainty of the doctrine of equivalents creates disincentives to invest in innovation).
the governing and the governed. Defining an invention in light of the art at the time of the invention brings coherence to this area of law and eliminates the need for the contorted doctrines that have developed in the field. Thus, for inventions in uncertain fields such as biospace, an invention should be defined in light of the art at the time of the invention.