Estate Tax Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares an Unrealistic Regulation

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The Federal Estate Tax, "originally conceived as an emergency measure,"
1 is a permanently established feature of today's taxing system. Imposed upon the privilege of transmitting property at death, the estate tax is measured according to the value of the property transferred.2 Specified exemptions and deductions are deducted from the value of the gross estate3 resulting in the taxable estate which is taxed at a progressive rate, graduated according to estate size.4 Since the tax is measured according to value, the valuation procedures used are of prime importance in computing the amount of tax due.

The cryptic provisions of the Internal Revenue Code offer little guidance in ascertaining the value of the gross estate, indicating merely:

The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.5

The code also provides that "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."6 Although Congress has enacted similar statutes since 1916,7 all of these provisions likewise have

1. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 2.1, at 5 (2d ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited as LOWNDES & KRAMER). The Federal Estate Tax was originally instituted "to defray the cost of preparedness as represented in the additional appropriations for the Army, Navy, fortifications, Military Academy, and deficiencies caused by the military situation." S. REP. 793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
3. Id. §§ 2051-56.
4. Id. § 2001.
5. Id. § 2031.
6. Id. § 2033.
7. "[Be it enacted] SEC. 202. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
   (a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of this death
been couched in general terms, and Congress has delegated to the Internal Revenue commissioner the power to issue "needful rules and regulations" implementing statutory intent. 8

In pursuance of this delegated duty, the commissioner has issued numerous regulations on valuation of property for estate tax purposes. A relatively recent treasury regulation on valuation has become the center of a growing controversy. This regulation prescribes a new criterion to be used in mutual fund 9 share valuation:

The fair market value of a share in an open-end investment company (commonly known as a "mutual fund") is the public offering price of a share, adjusted for any reduction in price available to the public in acquiring the number of shares being valued. 10

Since the public offering price of load fund shares includes an acquisition expense or sales load which adds nothing to the value of the shares, 11 this regulation has been strongly criticized as unrealistic and
unreasonable. Taxpayers' challenges to Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) have resulted in conflicting decisions among the federal courts of appeal. Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Davis v. United States and the Second Circuit in Cartwright v. United States have held this regulation invalid.

This note will discuss relevant valuation criteria prescribed in past regulations, consider arguments for and against the present mutual fund share regulation, and review decisions ruling upon its validity. This note will conclude with a recommendation that the well reasoned decision of Cartwright be affirmed.

Estate Tax—Regulatory History

Courts which have upheld Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) repeatedly have cited Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co. That case stated that "Treasury Regulations . . . constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons." Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b), however, is not a contemporaneous construction of...
any provision of the Internal Revenue Code,\textsuperscript{17} nor does it follow closely upon the advent of mutual funds, which originally appeared in the United States in the 1920's.\textsuperscript{18}

Perhaps, then, some guidance in the current controversy may be found by consulting the more nearly "contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes . . . ."\textsuperscript{19} Regulations issued in 1921 specified that the "value to be ascertained [in determining value of the gross estate] is the market, or sale, value of the property"\textsuperscript{20} while those of 1924 used the formula of "fair market value."\textsuperscript{21} As noted by one commentator:

The Federal Estate Tax Statute does not define the word "Value" but uses the term . . . without limitation. In the absence of a statutory definition the Treasury Department has defined the terms as meaning "fair market value" and this definition, which accords with the evident intent of the statute, has been accepted without question and is clearly correct.\textsuperscript{22}

Reference to the regulations preceding those in which the phrase "fair market value" first appeared helps explain the meaning which that phrase was intended to convey. After indicating that the pertinent value was the market, or sale, value of the property, the 1921 Regulations elucidated:

The highest price obtainable for the property within a reasonable period of the decedent's death is the value to be included. A sale of the property, however, in order to be accepted as the criterion of value, must be made in such manner as to insure the best price obtainable under existing circumstances. This requires (a) that the sale be made as a matter of business, and not merely in order to establish value; (b) . . . with a view to realizing as high a price as possible; and (c) that reasonable care and skill be exercised to obtain such price.\textsuperscript{23}

Market value in this regulation was defined as the value in cash which the estate could obtain by sale of the property. This general valuation principle has been expressed in an income tax context as "what-you-could-have-got-for-it-in-money-if-you-had-sold-it."\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{17} Since the statutory definition of value had been in the Revenue Acts since 1916, it is obvious that this Regulation cannot in any sense be deemed a contemporaneous construction of the statute. . . ." Davis v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
\textsuperscript{18} DACEY, supra note 11, at 23.
\textsuperscript{19} 333 U.S. at 501.
\textsuperscript{20} Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14 (1921).
\textsuperscript{21} Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 13(1) (1924).
\textsuperscript{22} 2 CCH STANDARD FEDERAL TAX SERV., ¶ 2021.02 (1931).
\textsuperscript{23} Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14 (1921).
\textsuperscript{24} Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748 (1943). While this definition was promulgated in an income tax context, "[t]here is no distinction, for most purposes . . . in the meaning of fair market value
sale requirements enumerated in the 1921 version of the regulations were condensed the following year in a formula which has survived in substance down to the present regulations:

[Market value is] the price which a willing buyer will pay to a willing seller for the property in question under the circumstances existing at the date of the decedent's death or within such reasonable period thereafter as would afford proper opportunity for an examination and sale thereof.\footnote{25}

The "willing-buyer-willing seller" formula thus emerged as a more generalized rule. That is, the estate was valued by theoretically placing the executor in the role of a good faith willing seller vis-à-vis a good faith willing buyer, thereby excluding a collusive sale for the purpose of establishing a low valuation of property.

This willing buyer-willing seller formula has been explained by Lowndes and Kramer as the proper valuation rule:

Valuation is based upon the gross amount which the willing buyer will presumably pay without any subtraction for the seller’s selling costs or commissions, income taxes, or other taxes payable by the seller out of the proceeds of the property, such as sales and excise taxes.\footnote{26}

Inherent in this explanation is the understanding that the estate is the willing seller. Thus it appears that "[t]he touchstone of fair market value has always been the price which a willing seller could reasonably be expected to be able to obtain from a disposition of the property in question."\footnote{27}

Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares

The general willing buyer-willing seller rule has been found to be inappropriate for valuation of a specific category of property interests. This class of property interests, comprised of certain life insurance and annuity contracts, has been recognized as requiring a special valuation rule because of their atypical character.\footnote{28} In contrast, mutual fund

\footnote{26. LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 1, § 18.12, at 441.}
\footnote{27. Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871, 878 (1968) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). Judge Tannenwald concluded: "It is the total amount obtainable by the seller from the only available actual purchaser, not the price which a theoretical purchaser would pay another seller, which should control." \textit{Id.} at 880.}
\footnote{28. Characteristics peculiar to such insurance policies had been deemed to justify their evaluation for gift and estate tax purposes at replacement value. United-States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941); Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941); DuPont v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).}
shares had been recognized by the commissioner to be in the same classi-
fication as securities which were valued under the willing buyer-willing
seller rule.\textsuperscript{29} However, by issuing Treasury Regulation 20.2013-8(b),
the commissioner unexpectedly classified mutual fund shares with insur-
ance and annuity contracts. While the mutual fund shares had "super-
ficial similarities"\textsuperscript{30} with such contracts, they were fundamentally dis-
parate in nature.

"'[I]nsurance' involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of
the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts,"\textsuperscript{31} and "[a]n annuity
may be defined as an insurance contract wherein the insurer, in consid-
eration of a certain premium, promises to pay a definite amount of in-
come to the annuitant."\textsuperscript{32} In comparison, mutual fund shares do not
entail a contract for payment of a fixed sum. The owner of an insur-
ance contract may be able to sell it for more than its cash surrender
value, but the owner of mutual fund shares realistically cannot expect
to obtain more than their redemption price upon sale.\textsuperscript{33} Contractual
assurance that a specified sum will be paid, possibility of sale at more
than cash surrender value and considerations of varying insurability\textsuperscript{34}
help justify valuation of insurance and annuity contracts at replacement
value. No such justification exists in the case of mutual fund shares.\textsuperscript{35}

The classification of insurance contracts and mutual fund shares
in the same category carried in its wake a fundamental and radical
change in mutual fund share valuation. Taxpayers had formerly val-
ued such shares at redemption price—the sum which the estate could
realize by their sale.\textsuperscript{36} Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b), by requir-
ing inclusion of the sales load in valuation of mutual fund shares, in
effect ordered the estate to value the shares at their "retail" cost. The

\textsuperscript{29} Report of the Committee on Estate \& Gift Taxes, 19 BULL. A.B.A. Sec-
tion of Taxation, July 1966, at 73.

\textsuperscript{30} Comment, Taxation—Valuation of Shares in Open-End Investment Com-
panies for Federal Estate Tax Purposes Held to Be Replacement Cost, 44 N.Y.U.L.


\textsuperscript{32} Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Estate and Inheritance

\textsuperscript{33} Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1972).

\textsuperscript{34} "[W]hen the insured is uninsurable, the policy is worth more than the cost
of a like policy . . . ." 54 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 895 (1941).

\textsuperscript{35} One essential difference between insurance contracts and mutual fund shares
is that mutual fund shares do not furnish the "type of promise which is basic to an in-
surance undertaking." Gordon, Investment-Insurance Arrangements, in Conference
on Mutual Funds 34 (1966). "[T]he mutual fund cannot promise to . . . pay any
specific amount of income." Investment Company Institute, 1972 Mutual Fund
Fact Book 5.

\textsuperscript{36} Report of the Committee on Estate \& Gift Taxes, 19 BULL. A.B.A. Section
of Taxation, July 1966, at 73. See also text accompanying note 29 supra.
improper classification of mutual fund shares with insurance contracts resulted in treating the estate as a willing buyer instead of the traditionally accepted willing seller.

20.2031-8(b)—The Beginning

What began as an erroneous categorizing of mutual fund shares with insurance contracts was to have still further consequences. Regulation 20.2031-8(b) prescribing valuation of mutual fund shares represented the vanguard effort of the commissioner to effect a fundamental change in the method of property valuation for estate tax purposes. One day subsequent to the issuance of 20.2031-8(b), an amendment prescribing a retail basis of valuation for all “property in general” made its appearance as a proposal “in tentative form” in the Federal Register. 37 Previously, the Estate Tax Regulations had offered the traditional explication of fair market value:

The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market value of a particular item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. 38

In 1965, however, 20.2031-1(b) was amended to include the following sentences:

Nor is the fair market value of an item of property to be determined by the sale price of the item in a market other than that in which such item is most commonly sold to the public . . . . Thus, in the case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, which is generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value of such an item of property is the price at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at retail. For example, the fair market value of an automobile (an article generally obtained by the public in the retail market) includible in the decedent's gross estate is the price for which an automobile of the same or approximately the same description, make, model, age, condition, etc., could be purchased by a member of the general public and not the price for which the particular automobile of the decedent would be purchased by a dealer in used automobiles. 39

Thus Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b), owing its existence to an unwarranted classification of mutual fund shares with insurance and annuity contracts, served as a precedent for the more ambitious amendment of 1965. This amendment to 20.2031-1(b) in turn was used by the commissioner as a bootstrap argument when estate taxpayers later

contested valuation of their mutual fund shares at a figure greater than
that which could be realized by their sale:

The method prescribed by Section 20.2031-8(b) for the valuation of mutual fund shares accords with the principles of valuation for estate tax purposes set forth in the more general regulation (Section 20.2031-1(b)), which provides that the fair market value of an item generally obtainable at retail is its retail price and not the price obtainable by selling it back to a dealer.\textsuperscript{40}

To date, as noted in a taxpayer's challenge of the mutual funds regulation, the departure from traditional estate tax valuation of property embodied in Treasury Regulation 20.2031-1(b)'s retail market theory of valuation is not being enforced by the commissioner.\textsuperscript{41} It is only the narrower retail market theory of 20.2031-8(b) which the commissioner is endeavoring to enforce and which has recently created conflict between the circuits.

Realistic Valuation of Securities

Despite the anomalous grouping of mutual fund shares with insurance and annuity contracts in the current regulations, "[t]he first lesson which we must learn in connection with mutual funds is that mutual fund shares constitute securities."\textsuperscript{42} Thus, the revolutionary character of the new regulation concerning valuation of mutual fund shares can be highlighted by consideration of other regulations pertaining to estate tax valuation of securities. An early regulation for security valuation provided:

The value of stocks and bonds listed upon a stock exchange should be determined by taking the mean between the highest and lowest quoted selling price upon the date of death. . . .

. . . .

Where securities are actively quoted on a bid and asked basis and actual sales are not available, the bid price as of the date of death will be accepted as the value.\textsuperscript{43}

In the over-the-counter securities market, the bid price, or what the dealer "maintaining a market"\textsuperscript{44} in a particular security is offering to pay, approximates what the owner may expect to get for his stock.

\textsuperscript{40} Brief for Appellant at 13, Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).

\textsuperscript{41} Brief for Appellee at 23, Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972).


\textsuperscript{43} Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2) (1922).

\textsuperscript{44} A dealer "maintains a market" in a security when he "is known to be willing at all times to buy or sell that security . . . at the prices he quotes." L. LOLL, JR. & J. BUCKLEY, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKETS 146 (2d ed. 1967).
In the exchange or auction market, however, a sale is more likely to occur between the highest bid and the lowest asked price. Perhaps with the exchange market in mind, the regulation was amended in 1934 to read:

In the case securities are quoted on a bona fide bid and asked basis, and actual sales are not available, the mean between the bid and asked prices as of the date of death, or the nearest date thereto if within a reasonable time thereof, will be accepted as the value.\textsuperscript{46}

These principles of valuation of securities were based on market realities. However, the commissioner in amending the regulations has not always examined such realities when defining fair market value. For example, when an estate included large blocks of corporate stock, taxpayers contended that it was not realistic to arrive at the fair market value of such a block by multiplying the value of one share times the number of shares held by the estate. This contention was premised on the fact that placing a large block of stock on the market would depress the per share price. This blockage theory, although in accord with the meaning of fair market value as used in the regulations, was vigorously contested by the commissioner, and in 1934 the regulations were amended to specifically prohibit the use of the blockage principle:

The fair market value of a particular kind of property includible in the gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price or by an estimate of what a whole block or aggregate would fetch if placed upon the market at one and the same time.\textsuperscript{46}

The size of holdings of any security to be included in the gross estate is not a relevant factor and will not be considered in such determination.\textsuperscript{47}

Despite the commissioner's "broadside leveled at any 'Blockage Rule',"\textsuperscript{48} taxpayers still contended that refusal to apply such a rule resulted in a "formalistic method which is at variance with

\textsuperscript{45} Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(3) (1934). In McNary v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 467 (1967), a taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court to find that "the only proper criterion for determining the fair market value of the securities included in the assets of this estate, the values of which were, on the valuation date, quoted on the over-the-counter market, is the quoted bid price" McNary v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 467, 469 (1967). The court in holding for respondent emphasized that petitioner had taken its position "[w]ithout the citation of any authority," Id. Authority may perhaps be found in the original reading of the applicable regulation. The 1934 amendment allows a more exact valuation of "fair market value" or what the owner can obtain by sale of stock quoted on an exchange, but it may not lead to a more reasonable determination of "fair market value" of stock which is sold over the counter.

\textsuperscript{46} Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(1)'(1934).

\textsuperscript{47} Id., Art. 13(3).

\textsuperscript{48} Peters, \textit{The Fair Market Value of Blocks of Stock}, 17 \textit{Taxes} 17, 18 (1939).
reality"—the pertinent reality being "the point at which supposititious willing buyers might agree with this seller."

In a case where decedent owned 35,966 shares of a particular stock, the commissioner valued this block at $44 per share, based on sales of a few hundred shares at prices between $45 and $43 on the date of death. In view of the general downward trend, it was certain that if so large a block had been placed on the market on that date, "the price would . . . have . . . been instantly depressed." Concluding that "the Commissioner's method . . . does not, as to this block of shares, result in a figure which is consistent with reality," the Board of Tax Appeals found that the value of the 35,966 share block was not more than $35 per share. The Fourth Circuit affirmed holding that "the Board was right in basing its conclusions upon the realities as it found them . . . . It could not ignore the pregnant fact, having found it to exist, that a large block of stock cannot be marketed and turned into money as readily as a few shares." The Fourth Circuit in a subsequent decision in which it applied the blockage rule stated that its decision was reached "notwithstanding the restrictive provisions of the regulations." Another court, in applying the blockage rule, reconciled its decision with the regulations stating: "[t]he regulations . . . provide that 'all relevant facts and elements of value as of the time of the decedent's death should be considered in every case.'" The practical outcome of these cases was similar, because both courts refused to be bound by a regulation not "consistent with reality."

50. Id. at 263.
51. Id. at 262.
52. Id. at 262-63.
53. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938).
54. Helvering v. Kimberly, 97 F.2d 433, 434 (4th Cir. 1938). This case concerned valuation for gift tax purposes, but the Gift Tax Regulations had been similarly amended to include an anti-blockage provision. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(3) (1932).
55. Knobloch v. Smith, 25 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Conn. 1938). Decedent owned 14,778 shares of a stock of which 200 shares were sold at $19 per share on the valuation date. "The Government relied solely on the proposition that certain provisions of the regulations, which require disregard of blockage, are controlling." Id. at 157. Noting that so large a block of stock could have been sold on valuation date only "to an underwriter . . . who would want a concession of from three to five points below the market," the court valued the stock at $15 per share. Id. at 156.
56. Accord, Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1938); Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Conn. 1937), wherein the court stated: "Although there was no actual necessity for a sale of the total block of stock on the date of the decedent's death, the determination of the fair market value as of that date requires the estimation of the price that could have been obtained for all the shares on that day, for the reason that fair market value as of a given date means the price that could
After encountering this judicial reluctance, the blockage proscription was deleted from the regulations. The demise of this prohibition made possible a realistic valuation of large blocks of stock. Conversely, the new mutual fund share regulation precludes valuation on a realistic basis. This lack of economic reality has been a key factor in the recent judicial refusals to uphold Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b).

Regulation 20.2031-8(b) and the Courts

Courts refusing to uphold Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) have treated it as "unrealistic" and "artificial." When this regulation is taken in combination with the 1965 amendment to Treasury Regulation 20.2031-1(b), it appears as not only an unrealistic regulation but one which ignores the legislative intent of statutes pertaining to the estate tax, as revealed in earlier regulatory constructions and court interpretations. However, the courts initially failed to question its lack of economic reality. The first challenge to Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) occurred in Wells v. Commissioner. Noting that treasury regulations are not to be held invalid merely because a taxpayer suggests reasonable or preferable alternatives, but "are to be sustained unless they are found to be unreasonable and plainly inconsis-
tent with the revenue statutes," the Tax Court with six judges dissenting concluded that the regulation was reasonable. Soon after the Wells decision, the analogous gift tax regulation came before the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in Howell v. United States. The Howell court citing Wells declared that it was "not convinced . . . that the Regulation . . . is unreasonable or out of harmony with the statute." The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the Tax Court's Wells decision noting that although prior to 1963 the regulations had not prescribed valuation of mutual fund shares at public offering price, "[t]he Commissioner has chosen [another] criterion and, if it is a reasonable one, we are not at liberty to second guess him."

The trend to hold the regulation invalid began with Davis v. United States in which the District Court for the Central District of California concluded that a regulation so unrealistic could not be reasonable. This opinion has been cited approvingly by the district courts for both the Western District of New York and the District of Colorado. The Second Circuit in Cartwright v. United States also has recently held that Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) is unrealistic and establishes an improper criterion for valuation of mutual fund shares. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed the Davis decision, thus becoming the second court of appeals to hold Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) invalid. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Cartwright decision and will resolve the present conflict. A brief review of the arguments for and against Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) may suggest what the outcome will be in the Supreme Court.

Arguments Presented in the Cases

The commissioner in support of Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) points out that it is consistent with the 1965 revision of 20.2031-

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61. Id. at 875.
62. An amendment providing for valuation of mutual fund shares at public offering price for gift tax purposes was added to the gift tax regulations at the same time that the mutual fund amendment was added to the estate tax regulations. T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 417.
63. 290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969).
64. Id. at 694.
70. Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
1(b). Furthermore, he contends that the only willing buyer-willing seller transaction which occurs with regard to mutual funds is the one in which individuals purchase shares at the public offering price since the fund is required by statute to redeem shares at a set redemption price. The district court in Cartwright noted that this “theory disregards the facts of acquisition” where shares are acquired by inheritance or at redemption price through reinvestment of dividends. The court also criticized the argument’s disregard of the fact that “both the buyer and seller . . . willingly enter into the transaction,” which includes agreement on the part of the fund to redeem the shares at net asset value when the owner decides to sell them. The Ninth Circuit similarly declared that open-end investment companies are willing buyers when they redeem shares since “the redemption market is the market upon which both parties agree when the shares are purchased. The mutual fund chooses to operate in such form under the law and the public buys shares in the fund fully apprised of its redemption opportunities through company prospectuses.” The Investment Company Institute states that the decision to engage in business as an open-end investment company entails a voluntary decision to accept the legal obligation to redeem shares and that a mutual fund is thus a “willing buyer.”

The commissioner also argued that mutual fund shares should be valued similarly to insurance policies on the life of a person other than the decedent and annuity contracts, which had previously been in a category by themselves for estate tax valuation. The majority in Wells v. Commissioner was persuaded that the 1963 amendment to the regulations placing mutual funds in the same category with such insurance and annuity contracts was “recognition that investment company shares are a different breed of cats from ordinary stocks and bonds; and

74. 323 F. Supp. at 772.
75. Shareholders of some load funds are able to purchase additional shares at net asset value through reinvestment of dividends. H.R. Rep., supra note 9, at 215.
76. 323 F. Supp. at 772.
77. Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972).
78. The Investment Company Institute is a trade association of the mutual fund industry. Its members hold about ninety-three percent of all mutual fund assets. H.R. Rep., supra note 9, at 4 n.15.
79. Brief for Investment Company Institute as Amicus Curiae at 18, Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
80. “The Treasury has . . . grouped mutual funds with those few types of assets which are valued at replacement cost.” Marks, Little-Publicized Valuation Regs. Mean Higher Estate and Gift Taxes, 22 J. TAXATION 286 (1965). At the time this article was published, Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-1(b) had not been revised in an endeavor to add “property in general” to those “few types of assets” so valued. See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
when it comes to valuing them, a different criterion can reasonably be applied, more nearly like that applied to life insurance and annuity contracts than stocks and bonds.\textsuperscript{81} Unconvinced by this reasoning, the Colorado district court observed: "The Commissioner cannot cross-breed life insurance and investment trust shares by the simple expedient of discussing them in separate paragraphs of a single regulation."\textsuperscript{82} In \textit{Cartwright} the Second Circuit fully concurred in the district court's refusal to accept the insurance-mutual fund share analogy.\textsuperscript{83} In the words of the district court, "mutual funds and insurance policies are so different that the bundle of rights in each cannot be compared."\textsuperscript{84} A Supreme Court case concerning valuation of an insurance policy has emphasized the contractual obligation of the insurer to pay a sum certain at a future date.\textsuperscript{85} As noted in the \textit{Wells} dissent, "there was no evidence that the [insurance] policy could not have been sold, albeit in a limited market, at its replacement value or at least at a price in excess of its cash surrender value."\textsuperscript{86} In contrast "[t]he ordinary and only practical method of disposition [of mutual fund shares] is redemption."\textsuperscript{87}

The commissioner further argued that since inclusion of the excise tax in valuation of jewelry for estate and gift tax purposes has received court approval,\textsuperscript{88} inclusion of the sales load in valuation of mutual fund shares similarly should be sanctioned.\textsuperscript{89} The cases involving excise tax, however, emphasized taxpayer's failure to produce evidence supporting valuation at a lower price than that which had been paid.\textsuperscript{90} One court concluded that the price paid by the taxpayer and "market value realizable on sale of the diamonds to an individual for his personal use might well have been substantially the same."\textsuperscript{91} Rev-

\textsuperscript{81} 50 T.C. 871, 876 (1968).  
\textsuperscript{82} Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Colo. 1971).  
\textsuperscript{83} 457 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1972).  
\textsuperscript{84} 323 F. Supp. 769, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).  
\textsuperscript{85} Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941): "[T]he owner of a fully paid life insurance policy . . . has the right . . . to receive the face amount of the policy upon the insured's death." See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.  
\textsuperscript{86} 50 T.C. at 879 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).  
\textsuperscript{87} 323 F. Supp. at 771.  
\textsuperscript{89} Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1969).  
\textsuperscript{90} "The sole evidence consisted of the cost to the taxpayer of obtaining the jewelry. . . ." Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1952). "The court [in \textit{Publicker v. Commissioner}] stated that in view of the irreconcilable conflict of testimony of the expert witnesses, the cost of the jewelry, including . . . excise tax, was considered as the best evidence of value." Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 \textsc{Cum. Bull.} 110, 111.  
\textsuperscript{91} Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1953).
venue Ruling 55-71 further reveals the difficulty in drawing support for inclusion of the sales load by analogy to inclusion of the excise tax in valuation for estate tax purposes:

The existence of the Federal excise tax on jewelry, furs, and other related articles of personal property sold by dealers, is an item which will tend to increase the amount at which an individual or an estate would be willing to sell such property. . . .

In view of the foregoing, it is held that the Federal excise tax on . . . articles of personal property is a relevant factor which should be considered in determining the fair market value of such property for Federal estate and gift tax purposes.92

Since the only practical manner of disposing of mutual fund shares is to resell them to the issuing company at redemption price, Judge Tannenwald, in his cogent and persuasive dissent in Wells, compared the situation of a person wishing to sell his mutual fund shares to that of one wishing to sell stock subject to a binding restriction, requiring that the “shares may not be sold without offering them to a third person at a certain price” in which case “that price becomes the ceiling for determining the fair market value of the shares for estate tax purposes."993

Similarly, the district court in Davis concluded that “[a]lthough there is no binding contract in this case, the rationale of Treas. Reg. 20.2031-2(h) (1958) should apply to open-end investment shares because the redemption price offered by the company truly represents the only realistic value that the estate can obtain for the shares of the open-end investment company."994 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the commissioner contended that the trial court had “erred in its analogy of mutual fund shares to a stock or bond that is subject to a binding contract to purchase” because such restrictive agreements “may operate to affect the fair market value of property for estate tax purposes [only if] the executor is obligated to sell for the price fixed by the agreement."995

However, courts have repeatedly held that a restrictive agreement requiring the owner of stock to offer it to certain parties at a specified price before selling it to anyone else has a depressing effect upon the fair market value of the stock. Even if the right to purchase is not exercised by those who have the right of first refusal, the owner cannot expect to sell the stock for the price he could obtain were it not encumbered by a restriction. Thus fair market value in this instance as

93. 50 T.C. at 878 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
94. 306 F. Supp. at 955. When securities are subject to an option or contract to purchase under which the decedent was not free to dispose of them “at any price he chooses during his lifetime” and which “represents a bona fide business arrangement,” the option or contract price is considered in determining fair market value. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 481.
95. Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
in others is determined by what the owner can realize in money for his property. 96

**Conclusion**

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently stated: “A person who invests in a load fund does not obtain an interest in the fund equal in value to the amount that he pays for his shares, since the sales load is first deducted from the purchase price.” 97 Thus Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) is inconsistent not only with the term value as used in Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code but also with the provision in Section 2033 that the gross estate is to include the value of all property “to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.” 98 These inconsistencies were recognized in *Davis*:

The sales load is a charge for service which is paid by the buyer at purchase and never recovered. It adds nothing to the value of the shares . . . . To apply the estate tax rate to the sales charge paid is to impose a tax on a nonexistent “interest of the decedent.” The regulation which permits it . . . is inconsistent with . . . 26 U.S.C. § 2033. 99

The principal justifications of the Federal Estate Tax are generally considered to be production of revenue and prevention of excessive concentrations of wealth. 100 If these considerations now justify a change in the manner in which property is valued for estate tax purposes, the change should not culminate in a procedure which is patently unrealistic. If the commissioner wishes to effect changes, he must do so within the bounds of the congressional mandate from which he derives his authority and by regulations not inconsistent with the statutes they are designed to implement. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will resolve the current conflict between the statutes and regulations by affirming the decision in *Cartwright v. United States*.

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96. *E.g.*, Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578, 582 (1st Cir. 1943) wherein the court stated: “To be sure the restriction does not affect the value of the stock so long as the owner does not wish to sell, but it is not this value which, under the regulations, is to be used as the basis for computing the tax. The value to be used for this purpose is the ‘fair market value’ . . . .” *Accord*, Mathews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). *But see* Koch v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 363 (1933); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 663 (1931).

97. H.R. REP., supra note 9, at 52.

98. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033.


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