3-1-1972

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Rehnquist Facing Issue
Of Judicial Propriety

By FRED P. GRAHAM
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WASHINGTON, March 1

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, a former assistant attorney general who vigorously advocated many of the law-and-order policies of the Nixon Administration, is facing some sensitive questions of judicial propriety because some of those same issues are now coming before the Supreme Court.

At issue is when a justice should disqualify himself from ruling on a case — a murky legal area that has produced several controversies in recent years over alleged conflicts between judges' financial holdings and their work on the bench.

But last week a series of incidents occurred involving Rehnquist that presented this problem in an even more elusive context. The question was: When should a justice decline to rule on a case because of the appearance that he was too close to one side?

AT THE HEART of the matter is the fact that Rehnquist until last month, was chief of the Department of Justice's office of legal counsel. It had been an obscure post until he used it to become one of the leading public advocates and legal theoreticians of the Justice Department's controversial prosecution policies.

He became so closely identified with some Justice Department positions that it was assumed he would disqualify himself when cases raising the constitutionality of those positions came before the court.

One of those issues appeared to be the subpenaing of reporters to disclose confidential information. When the issue arose in 1970 over the Justice Department's subpenaing of Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist spoke out publicly in support of the Justice Department's position, although he refrained from discussing the Caldwell case specifically.

AT A PANEL discussion in Washington on Oct. 29, 1970, Rehnquist defended the power of the courts to compel testimony as "the cornerstone of civil and criminal litigation."

In reply to journalists' arguments that compelling reporters to disclose confidences would violate the First Amendment by damaging their capacity to gather news, Rehnquist said that "the core of this freedom is the right to print" and that it did not apply with the same force to "restraints on the gathering of news."

Rehnquist also reportedly helped prepare the Justice Department's press subpena guidelines, issued in August 1970.

One hint that he may have played a further behind-the-scenes role on the press subpena issue is the existence of a memorandum that his staff prepared for him on Feb. 10, 1970, long before the guidelines were contemplated.

THE MEMORANDUM surveyed the law on the subject, concluded that the legal precedents did not support Caldwell's refusal to obey the subpena, and declared that to recognize a First Amendment privilege on behalf of reporters "opens the door to undue extensions of freedom of the press to accomplish the aims of an economic group to the detriment of the public generally."

Thus, when Caldwell's case came up for argument last week, it came as a surprise when Rehnquist, by remaining behind the bench, indicated he would take part in the case.

EARLIER THAT DAY, the court issued an order announcing that it would review Senator Mike Gravel's suit to block the Justice Department from investigating his role in the publication of the Pentagon papers.

As an assistant attorney general, Rehnquist had helped prepare the government's suit to block the New York Times' publication of material from the Pentagon papers. He did not disqualify himself from the Gravel case.

There have been two cases so far in which Rehnquist has disqualified himself.

IN ONE, involving the immunity granted persons who are compelled to testify before grand juries, he had been scheduled to argue the Government's case before the Supreme Court. In the other, concerning governmental wire-tapping without court orders, he had helped prepare the Justice Department's brief.

In making these decisions to take part in certain cases and abstain from others, Rehnquist has had some precedents and principles to follow, but there are no black-and-white rules to guide him in deciding on the propriety of his actions.

On one occasion, Justice Robert H. Jackson disqualified himself from a case because of his former role as Solicitor General and then publicly chided Justice Frank Murphy, who had been Attorney General at the same time but took part in the case.

At Senate hearings on his confirmation, Rehnquist said that he would be guided by a brief that was prepared at the time that Byron R. White left the Justice Department to join the high court.

According to Rehnquist, this brief advised that a justice should step aside from any case in which he had personally participated as a Justice Department lawyer, or involving legislation of which he was guiding or drafting. But it would not have a justice disqualify himself from a case involving a Justice Department policy he helped shape.

The proposed code of judicial conduct being prepared by a special committee of the American Bar Association suggests that mere close proximity of a case to a lawyer can be ground for him not to rule on it if he later becomes a judge.

Under the general rule that "a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," the code says that a judge should not sit on a case in which "a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter."

This rule suggests that sensitivities are most acute when a judge who is new to the bench decided issues with which he was associated, even remotely, as an advocate. This is particularly so when the issues are emotionally charged cases with heavy political and ideological overtones.