3-1-1972

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On High Court Issues In Which He Had Earlier Role

Rehnquist Faces Questions Of Judicial Propriety

By FRED P. GRAHAM
New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON — Justice William H. Rehnquist, a former assistant attorney general who vigorously advocated many of the law-and-order policies of the Nixon administration, is now facing some sensitive questions of judicial propriety as some of those same issues are coming before the Supreme Court.

At issue is when a justice should disqualify himself from ruling on a case — a murky legal area that has produced several controversies in recent years over alleged conflicts between judges' financial holdings and their role on the bench.

But last week a series of incidents occurred involving Rehnquist that presented this problem in an even more elusive context. Here the question was when a justice should decline to rule on a case because of the appearance that he was too close to one side.

First Amendment by damaging journalists' capacity to gather news, he said that "the core of this freedom is the right to print" and that it did not apply with the same force to "restraints on the gathering of news."

Rehnquist also reportedly helped prepare the Justice Department's press subpoena guidelines, issued in August 1970.

One hint that he may have played a further behind-the-scenes role on the press subpoena issue is the existence of a memorandum on the subject that his staff prepared for him Feb. 10, 1970, long before the guidelines were contemplated.

LAW CHECKED

The memorandum surveyed the law on the subject, concluded that the legal precedents did not support Caldwell's refusal to obey the subpoena, and declared that to recognize a First Amendment privilege on behalf of reporters "opens the door to undue extensions of freedom of the press to accomplish the aims of an economic group, to the detriment of the public generally."

Thus, when Caldwell's case came up for argument last week, eyebrows were raised in the courtroom as Rehnquist, by remaining behind the bench, indicated he would take part in the case.

Earlier the same day, the court issued an order announcing it would review Sen. Mike Gravel's suit to block
the Justice Department from investigating his role in the publication of the Pentagon papers.

As an assistant attorney general, Rehnquist had helped prepare the Justice Department's suit to block the New York Times' publication of material from the Pentagon papers. He did not disqualify himself from the Gravel case.

TWO CASES STHERE

There have been two cases so far in which Rehnquist has disqualified himself.

In one, involving the immunity granted persons who are compelled to testify before grand juries, he had been scheduled to argue the government's case before the Supreme Court. In the other, concerning governmental wiretapping, he had helped prepare the Justice Department's brief.

In making these decisions to take part in certain cases and abstain from others, Rehnquist has had some precedents and principles to follow, but there are no black-and-white rules. As judge, Rehnquist had helped shape Justice Department policy.

The proposed code of judicial conduct being prepared by a special committee of the American Bar Association suggests that mere close proximity of a case to a lawyer can be grounds for him not to rule on it if he later becomes a judge.

Under the general rule that "a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," the code says a judge should not rule on a case in which "a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter."

This rule suggests that sensitivities are most acute when a judge who is new to the bench decides issues with which he was associated, even remotely, as an advocate. This is particularly so when the issues are emotionally charged ones with heavy political and ideological overtones.