Mutual Funds Scandals - Comparative Analysis of the Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments

Authors

Jerry W. Markham

Abstract

This article undertakes a comparative analysis of the mechanisms used to regulate collective investments. The article first traces the growth and development of mutual funds and their regulation and concludes that the corporate governance model for mutual funds has failed. The article then examines alternative regulatory schemes for collective investments, including hedge funds, commodity pools, common trust funds, collective investment funds for pensions, endowments, and insurance company reserves. The article concludes that alternative regulatory structures would serve at least as well as the current regulatory structure for mutual funds, which has proved to be overly costly, complex, and ineffective.

Recommended Citation

Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Funds Scandals - Comparative Analysis of the Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 Hastings Bus. L.J. 67 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol3/iss1/3