Holding the Spymasters Accountable after 9/11: A Proposed Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements under the Freedom of Information Act

Authors

Martin E. Halstuk

Abstract

For the last two decades, near-blanket CIA secrecy has gone largely unchecked, principally because of CIA v. Sims, a sweeping 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision that exempted the Agency from virtually any disclosure requirements under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The uncurbed secrecy that the Court has sanctioned effectively blocks public and press efforts to evaluate CIA performance, thus making Agency accountability difficult, if not impossible. The well-publicized missteps and failures by the CIA in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks illustrate the follies of how excessive secrecy can conceal grave problems in Agency management. This article argues that the Sims rationale for carte blanche CIA secrecy, based on a 1947 model, has been long outmoded by watershed historic events such as the Watergate scandal and the end of the Cold War, which have prompted a profound cultural shift in terms of what the American public have come to expect to know about their government and demand in transparency. The author, therefore, proposes a legislative model that would establish new guidelines for CIA information disclosure requirements under the FOIA.

Recommended Citation

Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable after 9/11: A Proposed Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements under the Freedom of Information Act, 27 UC Law SF Comm. & Ent. L.J. 79 (2004).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol27/iss1/3