In this paper, I use the certainty-severity tradeoff as my analytical lens—a novel move in antitrust—to explain the difference between U.S. and Indian antitrust law. I argue that, in antitrust, India prefers certainty of enforcement while the U.S. prefers severity of enforcement. This difference is not driven by doctrine or economic policy; rather, I locate this difference in six key institutional factors. And using economic theory, I argue that a difference in social attitudes to risk explains and justifies this institutionally-manifested difference in law.
The Certainty-Severity Tradeoff in Antitrust Law and Administration: Where the United States and India Differ,
46 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 39
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol46/iss1/4