Traditional antitrust jurisprudence has assumed that competition constitutes the only legitimate policy basis for antitrust doctrine. This Article disputes that assumption, arguing that early antitrust history also reflects strong commitments to commonlaw property rights. This Article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of vertical restraints doctrine by analyzing it within the framework of competition policy and common-law property rights in productive conflict. Employing this framework, the Article concludes that current vertical restraints doctrines are largely the product of property rights in restraint of competition policy. This Article also raises new questions about the relationship between the efficiency norm of modern antitrust law and the tension between competition policy and property rights.
Rudolph J. Peritz,
A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine,
40 Hastings L.J. 511
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol40/iss3/2