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Hastings Law Journal

Abstract

Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are necessary judicial creations for the just and efficient adjudication of lawsuits in an increasingly complex and overburdened court system. In Finley v. United States, however, the United States Supreme Court threatened the viability of these doctrines by requiring explicit congressional authorization for the exercise of extrajurisdictional power. Realizing Finley's negative import, Congress alleviated the Supreme Court's threat within a year and a half of the decision. In enacting section 1367 of Title 28 of the United States Code, Congress supplied the federal courts with the express legislative authorization required by Finley. Expanding the federal courts' pre-Finley pendent and ancillary powers in some regards and restricting them in others, Congress regularized and clarified many of the doctrines' prior inconsistencies.

This Note examines Congress' post-Finley resurrection of federal extra-jurisdictional power. After reviewing the development of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and exploring Finley's practical implications, the Note analyzes the new uniform framework of "supplemental jurisdiction" under section 1367. The author then proposes a scheme of statutory interpretation that would ensure that parties and claims are joined in a consistent manner. Such a construction also would aid federal courts in effectuating Congress' objective: the fair and efficient use of the judicial system.

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