This Note examines the rules governing the election of the United Nations Secretary-General. The rules, developed at the nascency of the Cold War, reflect an effort to accommodate superpower conflicts, and seem to contradict the broad principles that guided the development of the United Nations Charter.
This Note argues that the electoral rules are the catalyst for the regionalism, deadlock, and political maneuvering that plague elections of the Secretary-General. These problems, and the realities of a changing global political order, affirm the need to alter the electoral rules. The Note proposes a redefinition of each stage of the election, using terminology already existing in the United Nations Charter, and concludes that this reformation not only realigns the rules with Charter principles and prevents repetition of past problems, but also addresses the international imbalances generated by events of the past several years.
Joakim E. Parker,
Electing the U.N. Secretary-General after the Cold War,
44 Hastings L.J. 161
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol44/iss1/4