Hastings Law Journal
Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working
This Article discusses the problematic consequences that result from individuals having multiple international economic tribunals available to redress grievances. The Article describes the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, and discusses the jurisdictional and subject matter authorities of the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization Settlement Body, and various regional dispute settlement bodies and municipal courts. The author notes the most problematic consequences of utilizing a system involving multiple forums are the promotion of fragmentation and duplication of tribunal and court authority. In addition, the author discusses the effect of public and private law principles on fragmentation and duplication. The author reveals an in-depth analysis of cases illuminating the convoluted and negative results promoted by the fragmentation and duplication of authority. Generally, the author argues that fragmentation and duplication are undesirable consequences and result in inefficient and ineffective international dispute resolution. The author notes the practical importance of maintaining the various courts and tribunals while working to create a more holistic system. Finally, the author discusses how various directives and doctrines may assist international forums to coordinate and reduce the likelihood of fragmentation and duplication of authorities in order to maintain the long-term viability of international dispute settlement.
Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working,
59 Hastings L.J. 241
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol59/iss2/1