Using the sleep-disorder drug Provigil as a case study, this article exposes a new type of anticompetitive harm that stems from the combination of two distinct activities. First, brand-name drug firms such as Cephalon, the developer of Provigil, have settled patent litigation by paying generic firms to delay entering the market. Second, brand firms, frequently at the end of a patent term, have engaged in "product hopping," switching from one means of administering a drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule). The story of Provigil demonstrates the anticompetitive harm that can result from the combination of these two activities.
Michael A. Carrier,
Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior,
3 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 441
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol3/iss2/2